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Abstract 
 
This master/second-cycle dissertation concerns the problem of corporate credit in Poland and 
tries to determine the sources of banks’ unexpected hesitance to provide enterprises with 
additional liquidity, which was observed during the global financial crisis. It differentiates 
between fundamental and non-fundamental determinants, which – when combined – 
reconstruct the course of events that led to the slowdown. A special attention is devoted to 
variables believed to be behavioral and theoretically inconsistent with the conventional belief 
of how lending activities are coordinated. A structural vector autoregression (SVAR) is run 
and impulse response functions are produced to provide a numerical support for the developed 
theoretical framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The current credit crisis has reminded decision makers of the essential role performed 
by credit institutions in supplying capital to the economy, principally under financial distress. 
Credit facilities, if distributed equitably and at a fair price, thus being the crucial part of 
financial system stability, are vital stimulator of the economic growth. No major economy is 
capable of prospering without them. According to Factiva, a Dow Jones & Company and 
Reuters joint venture, which provides media monitoring tools, the phrase “credit crunch” 
appeared nearly 200,000 times in English speaking media in 2008. This figure halved in 2009 
and in 2010 there were only slightly more than 30,000 mentions. This shows how calling the 
issue was it at the time of its uppermost magnitude globally. 
According both to the Polish press and to the foreign-based journalists, Eastern 
European markets generally steered clear of the crisis and the conventional credit crunch did 
not happen, as the reasons of credit contraction lied not only on the supply side, but also on 
the demand side. However, the plain fact is that some form of retrenchment took place. On the 
basis of their own resources, enterprises may expand only to a limited extent. 
This thesis is designed to address and answer the question, what influenced Polish 
banks’ lending policies during this period and whether these policies deliberately aimed at the 
reduction of credit supply, or the contraction was one of their side-effects. 
This paper is neither to woe about the consequences of credit squeeze, nor to delineate 
policy recommendations of how to combat it. The research question is formulated clearly: 
what led to the corporate loans being choked off in a relatively remote economy, far from 
collateralized debt obligations, where banks did not find themselves anywhere near the verge 
of bankruptcy and the government almost did not have to manually safeguard the sector from 
collapse. In other words, the challenge is to define where the seeds for the crunch were 
planted, categorize those “seeds” as fundamental or behavioral, and try to apprehend whether 
these driving forces may potentially differ from the conventional regressors in a long-term 
model. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section contains introductory material, 
provides background and highlights stylized hypotheses for further research. The second 
section is devoted to the review of recent literature, as well as to data analysis and the 
mechanisms which links the stylized facts with corporate credit volumes. In the third section, 
behavioral dimension is examined. The fourth section presents and interprets estimations of 
the structural model’s equations. The last section concludes. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE CREDIT CRUNCH 
 
The recent crisis has dominated the public discourse in recent years. The pertaining 
issue is undoubtedly complex and very difficult to fathom ou thoroughly. This is why the 
deep analysis of current developments requires a careful selection of sufficiently narrow 
topics. The credit crunch is only one out of several main dimensions of the crisis, which 
include also e.g. financial markets, real estates or public debt issues. However, in the field of 
lending, the most vociferous media coverage concentrated mostly on housing and consumer 
loans, rather than on corporate credit problems. While the first ones were probably most 
interesting to the media recipients, the latter are thought to be more vital for the economy. 
Nevertheless, focusing on corporate credit in Poland is a sufficiently narrow perspective, 
allowing for an in-depth exploration of the subject. The crisis itself is treated here as a 
context, leaving room to a partly fundamental and partly behavioral analysis of corporate 
credit volumes. 
As figuratively noted by Alan Abelson (in Pixley, 2004: 161), former editor of 
“Barron’s”, ‘social relations of money between creditors and debtors have greater structural 
importance today than those between labour and capital’. If so, understanding of what 
influences these relations is a non-negligible assignment. Well before the crisis broke out, 
Rajan (2005: 37) wrote that market liberalization along with institutional change that made 
the way to improve credit and risk sharing opportunities, left the world more interlinked than 
ever before, and no country will be immune from the consequences of this “blessing or 
curse”. Poland is now praised to be somewhat a safe haven, but if a similar contraction repeats 
itself in future, the upshots of it will be more upsetting. At least this was the case with Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain, where, after the adoption of euro (a likely event to happen in Poland 
during the current decade), corporate lending got into its stride. The severity of crunch that 
emerged afterwards was augmented by a country’s negative balance of payments, which 
contributed to a sharp decline of potential GDP. (Woreta, Sankowski and Sepielak, 2010: 20) 
No prophet is needed to make us realize that a similar scenario for Poland is not just a piece of 
bad fantasy writing. Additionally, the prevalence of corporate lending in Poland is still subject 
to a massive catch-up, since it is estimated that only two out of ten Polish firms utilize credit 
facilities in their investment activity, as compared to seven out of ten doing so in the 
European Union (Czerwińska and Wilkowicz, 2011). 38 percent of Polish enterprises have 
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literally no contact with credit facilities and overall, the share of credits in Polish firms’ total 
liabilities does not even amount to 20 percent (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 6). 
Hence, this paper’s contribution to the pool of knowledge on corporate credit-related 
logic in Poland lies in the explanation of the crunch with the use of four-dimensional matrix 
of determinants: demand-side, supply-side, monetary and regulatory, and behavioral. 
 
1.1. Origination of the crunch  
 
Credit crunches are relatively infrequent, rarer than stock market slumps, and these two 
are not, in principle, correlated. For example, although the 2000-2002 stock market downturns 
were substantial, they were not followed by a credit crunch. Even during 1982 and 1989-1992 
slumps there was no serious crunch, at least in the domestic U.S. market. As Martin 
Hutchinson (2007) wrote, the last true credit crunch was thus that of 1973-1974, which was 
particularly severe in Britain but spread throughout the international debt markets. This was, 
naturally, before the working lifetime of most market participants today. 
If economic historians were to sketch the ever-present pattern of financial crises, they 
would develop more or less the following story. The source of the crisis is marked by a move 
of profit opportunities into a particular sector. This leads to omnipresent exhilaration and 
painting rosy pictures, which prompt overtrading, speculation, monetary expansion and, last 
but not least, lending to the hilt. Charles P. Kindleberger (in Pixley, 2004: 169) stresses that 
under such circumstances ‘financial institutions accept liability structures that decrease 
liquidity, and that in more sober climate they would have rejected’. This must finally trigger a 
sudden plunge and a panic, which is still just calm before the storm. A subsequent fall in 
prices reduces the value of collateral and induces banks to think twice before they lend again, 
which causes a hurry-scurry across the banks’ stakeholders. If it results in firms becoming 
insolvent, bank loans go bad and the stakeholders may no longer pretend that nothing 
happened. Whoever is hit, sells its worst securities if it is still possible, and its best – if it is 
unavoidable, in order to add to the liquidity. 
The recent credit crunch was barely an exception. Both its early stirrings in late 2006 
and its subsequent global impact in the following years actually harmonized with this outline. 
Obviously, several peculiarities intensified its magnitude. These were particularly financial 
innovations, as well as poor risk management and inept supervision. Returning to the point, 
the crisis was sparked by the collapse of the US subprime mortgages in mid-2007, and 
continued to affect other countries and markets over the course of the following years. The 
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channels, through which the disease has been streamlined, were the securitized bonds, held by 
many banks and insurers across the developed world. Lenders essentially sold the debt, 
including the most insidious subprime mortgages (mortgage-backed securities), almost 
straight away to the big Wall Street banks. Millions of these mortgage debts were pulled 
together, into deceiving collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which, being highly 
overvalued by rating agencies in a way that did not mirror their actual risk, were later sold on 
to investors. Meanwhile, in many parts of the United States, house prices were slipping, 
undermining the value of the collateral (Foley, 2007). 
Lending in the developed world experienced enormously tough time. For the first time 
in modern European history monetary mass shrank in absolute terms for three months, while 
historically the average historic monthly growth of euro M3 was around 50 billion euro. This 
means that the credit crunch has had a swift effect in the euro area of at least around 150 
billion euro of M3 vanishing. 
A harsh contraction in the availability of bank credit was a direct outcome of this 
unsustainable capital structure. Banks experienced financial distress not only because the 
securities they held defaulted, or dramatically depreciated. Additional reasons were the 
defaulted loans of economic agents, who were equally badly hit by the crisis, and the 
increased interest rates, which contribute to the increased cost of capital. In markets at the 
center of the conflagration, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the authorities 
had to rescue imperiled financial institutions (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). The 
recessionary atmosphere was in the air and further contractions were only a matter of time.  
By contrast, neither Japan nor most of emerging markets suffered substantial direct 
impact. Only a handful of banks in these countries had any exposure to subprime mortgages 
or junk securities. Virtually no one held them in Poland. Therefore, in the developing world, 
there were few signs of deterioration at all. Hungary was among the first emerging market 
countries to face the credit crunch, as its vulnerability stemmed from ‘fiscal deficit, reliance 
on external financing, and the extent of domestic, particularly household, borrowing in 
foreign currency’ (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2010: 861). Despite of this evidence, some 
researchers and the media argue that the emerging economies turned out to be so-called safe 
havens during this crisis, whereas they usually tended to be their main originators (Russia, Far 
East, Brazil). Some maintained that this is one of the most remarkable aspects of this global 
crunch. This does not hold for all developing countries, but there are only few exceptions to 
this general statement. No doubt that this is little exposure to the toxic subprime assets that 
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sheltered them from serious turbulences. Thus, in a way, emerging economies paradoxically 
benefited from their own backwardness. 
On the contrary, there are scholars and business practitioners, who claim that describing 
the crisis with the slogan ‘damage at the center, havens in the peripheries’ (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2008) is a too far-reaching simplification. It may indeed seem so from the 
Western perspective, but the underlying situation was a bit more puzzling. In absolute terms, 
the credit crunch, or at least slowdown, took place in the emerging economies as well. It was 
unquestionably not an aftermath of overinvesting in financial innovations, but rather the effect 
of decreased demand for exports and limited access to external funding (Brzoza-Brzezina and 
Makarski, 2010: 8). This hypothesis is confirmed by the underlying data. The ratio of 
outstanding bank loans to GDP in 2008 was only 52 percent in Poland (comparing to 116 
percent in the euro zone), while the ratio of exports and imports of goods to GDP in 2008 was 
70 percent in Poland (comparing to only 34 percent in the euro zone). This makes Poland less 
prone to a credit crunch and more prone to a plunge in external demand. (Brzoza-Brzezina 
and Makarski, 2010: 40). 
Unlike the previous crises, from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, the current one 
originated in developed economies and did not spread to emerging markets. Thus the 
predominant pattern of crises was reversed. However, to learn what has happened there in the 
meanwhile, the next chapter discusses the contemporaneous economic outlook in Poland. 
 
1.2. Background of the domestic slowdown 
 
In general, the credit crunch moved outward from financial centers in the second half of 
2008. But as it has already been said, the subprime crisis had merely slight direct impact in 
the leading emerging markets, including Poland, which had made only pint-sized investments 
in the toxic asset-backed securities. However, it has also been affirmed that an idyllic 
landscape of ubiquitous economic growth in the peripheries, and the crisis isolated in rich-
world financial centers, is by far an exaggeration. Let’s stop for a while to take a look, by 
which channels the crisis radiated out from the well-developed world and exacerbated into a 
sort of nerve-racking disease in Poland. 
The crunch of 2009 did not emerge as an unexpected shock. But its magnitude confused 
not only the optimists as Deputy Prime Minister, Waldemar Pawlak, but also pessimistic 
experts, as well as down-to-earth, full-fledged and tepid bankers. It was hardly believable that 
the credit dynamics will reach somewhere between 8 and 12 percent of yearly growth, 
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allowing for preservation of the 3-percent GDP growth (see Glapiak, 2008; Kawalec, 2008). 
The pessimists declared the worst case scenario is 0 percent growth. In fact, the corporate 
lending decreased by more than 4 percent throughout the 2009 and, what is more, failed to 
improve its standing throughout the whole 2010, while decreasing further by 1.6 percent. 
Lending in foreign currencies was even more affected. 
The issue of reduced corporate credit must be explored as a part of a broader landscape 
of the Polish banking sector. It consists of about 50 domestic banks, nearly 20 affiliates of 
foreign-based banks, which do not have to abide by the domestic banking regulations, nearly 
600 cooperative banks, and roughly 1,800 so-called SKOKs, operating as credit unions, which 
also do not have to bother about the Polish Financial Supervision Authority’s (Komisja 
Nadzoru Finansowego, later referred to as KNF) set of laws. 
Considerable share of foreign capital in the banking sector is typical for Central and 
Eastern European economies. Internationalization in Poland was “invited” and welcomed, not 
really unintentional. Foreign financial institutions were, back in the 1990s, meant to facilitate 
the integration of Polish banks with international markets. Yet in 1995, the asset share of 
foreign-owned banks in total banking assets of Poland amounted to only 4.2 percent, which 
was quite modest ratio as compared with Hungary (41.8 percent), Slovakia (32.7 percent) or 
Czech Republic (15.9 percent). This translated to seriously underdeveloped credit facilities, as 
total lending accounted for only 12.7 percent of GDP, twice below the percentage in Hungary 
and Slovakia, and fourfold below Czech Republic (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2010: 848-
849). Eventually, among fears and prejudices, political decisions have been made to make this 
transition possible at the end of the last century. Due to accusations of market manipulation, 
consolidations were preferred to IPO privatizations, but the process was still lethargic. A 
sustained public uproar led to the situation that two large banks were still state-owned in 
2005, PKO BP and BGŻ (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2010: 852-853). However, solely in 
terms of the asset share of foreign-owned banks, Poland outperformed all major transition 
economies yet by 1999 with 69.5 percent. This further raised to 74.2 percent in 2005, but by 
that year Slovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia and Hungary managed to allure even more 
foreign ownership and to leapfrog Poland once again. Between 1999 and 2005, Poland’s 
loans-to-GDP ratio failed to take off and remained at a poor level of 27.0-27.5 percent, well 
below the European Union average in providing credit to the private sector (Berger, 
Molyneux and Wilson, 2010: 856-860). One of the disadvantages of foreign ownership, 
emphasized quite sturdily back in the 1990s, was the limited enforceability of monetary 
policy. We shall return to this issue later on. 
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Source: Daruk, W., Michalewska, B., Stalkowski, B. (n.d.). 
 
Figure 1. Foreign assets’ share (percentage) and foreign banks’ share (percentage) in the 
Polish banking industry. 
 
Currently, Italian capital dominates in the Polish banking sector (ca. 14 percent in 
September 2009), along with German (ca. 10 percent), Dutch (ca. 10 percent), American (ca. 
6.5 percent) and Belgian (ca. 6.0 percent). Following the recent sale of BZ WBK by Allied 
Irish Bank, Irish shares (ca. 5 percent) will disappear, being replaced by Spanish. 
Solvency ratio and the level of internationalization proved to change correspondingly, 
i.e. it was normally greater in those banks, which were foreign-owned, and which overall 
contributed to the increased stability and the affirmative perception of the whole sector. This 
is coherent with Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005), who proved empirically that foreign 
ownership leads to more efficient banks in transition countries. They find that foreign-owned 
institutions are more cost-efficient and provide better service. The evidence is so strong that 
foreign-owned banks not only overwhelm government-owned domestic banks, but also the 
ones which were privatized, but the domestic capital remained. However, what proved 
beneficial during peaceful times obviously does not need to perform equally well in a 
turbulent setting. While de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) in a now bit outdated research 
maintain that foreign banks have had a stabilizing effect on total credit supply in CEE 
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countries, one would say, this time it was different. The only major bank that overcame the 
widespread aversion and managed to sustain the growth in corporate lending was fully Polish 
“national champion” PKO BP (Więcław, Kurasz and Stypułkowski, 2011). In each quarter in 
2008 and 2009 PKO BP issued from 2 to 4 bn PLN of new corporate loans (Bratkowski and 
Myjak, 2009: 25-26). No doubt that this significantly alleviated the impact of the contraction. 
However, as noted by Berger, Molyneux and Wilson (2010: 864), it is ambiguous whether the 
central banks of transition countries would be able to ‘maintain liquidity in the banking sector 
and confidence in domestic institutions if the foreign parent banks withdrew support’. The 
KNF has made it clear that only one third of Polish banks have reduced lending, while the 
other ones have not. This, however, may not hold for corporate lending exclusively 
(Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 6). 
The findings of Kruszka (2011: 16-18), whose data set stretches from 2000 to 2009 and 
covers twelve CEE economies, are also very valuable in this respect. In substance, there is a 
statistical correlation between the level of financial-wise international integration and the 
growth in credit volumes. Foreign-owned banks had on average a yearly growth rate reaching 
9 percentage points, as compared with domestic credit institutions. Though, the low 
significance of this interrelation is stressed. What was statistically more compelling was the 
influence of rating assessment of the foreign-based parent company. Its deterioration implies a 
significant decrease in growth rate of outstanding credit volume. Thus, the very presence of 
foreign-based banks in the economy is not a risk factor per se (neither is it a blessing factor, 
though, as the bank may happen to be low-rated). Still, the author does not differentiate the 
influenced credit volume by corporate and consumer, which posits a threat that the results are 
not fully relevant for this study. 
Finally, Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011: 17-18) analyze whether the share of foreign 
liabilities in the banking sector has an impact in shaping the response of output to financial 
crises. The hypothesis is convention, i.e. the greater the foreign share is, the more vulnerable 
is the economy. Indeed, this is what results have shown. The long-run effect on output is 3 
percent higher in countries characterized by a higher share of banks’ foreign liabilities 
compared with countries with a smaller share. 
Another interesting feature of the Polish banking sector is its excess liquidity. 
Typically, even a small-scale depression, in the age of economy understood as a system of 
communicating vessels, may trigger a chain reaction and spread quite efficiently, e.g. through 
the banks’ liquidity constraints, with all its consequences. However, this might be alleviated 
in Poland, as the domestic sector is known for its excess liquidity, as pointed out by Pietrzyk 
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(2005), Pietryka (2010), Wilkowicz (2011a), and indirectly also by Grodzicki, Hałaj and 
Żochowski (2010: 21), who remind that most of Polish banks are foreign-owned and, when in 
need, may effortlessly obtain extra funding. Excess liquidity amounted to 23,940 m PLN in 
2009, following the 118 percent growth as compared with 2008 (National Bank of Poland, 
2010: 44-45). It amounted its record highs in April 2011, when the NBP reported to collect 
101,8 billion PLN from banks as a result of the auction of 7-day money market bills (Glapiak, 
2011). This gives an idea of how big the excess liquidity actually is. Perhaps, this is also why 
the banking sector in Poland and their prospects, as regards liquidity risk, seemingly have not 
been considered as topical by the government. The Council of Ministers limited its effort to 
guarantee bank deposits up to 50,000 EUR (Balakrishnan, 2008). 
As shown below, the liquidity remained lavish, since banks were able to invest much in 
debt instruments. Bratkowski in Bratkowski and Myjak (2009: 10) remarks, however, that 
only some banks had huge numbers of money market bonds (i.e. they needed to allocate the 
excess liquidity somewhere), while some exhibited enormous amount of repo transactions 
(i.e. they were in need of liquidity). This dichotomy indicates that the situation of banks might 
have been highly polarized. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 2. The figure illustrates that Polish banks stayed liquid regardless of the slowdown, as 
they have been relentlessly purchasing new debt securities, even after they decided 
to narrow their lending activity. 
 
The recurring question of whether Polish banks were adjusting credit amounts to actual 
liquidity struggles, or the ones that, they predicted, are going to occur, seems self-explanatory. 
If liquidity concern was an issue, it referred to the future, not the present. 
Re-entering into the main topic, the magnitude of collapse was most notable in 
operating loans (decrease by 10.5 percent), while there was a slight rise in investment and real 
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estate credit, by 0.9 percent and 2.8 percent respectively. However, one must notice that the 
latter are typically long term and the sustained growth might result from the release of 
consecutive stages of financing, while the credits themselves had been accepted yet before the 
crisis broke out. 
From eyeballing the figures below it becomes clear, which types of corporate loans 
suffered most. The magnitude of collapse was most notable in operating loans (a year-on-year 
decrease by 10.7 percent in December 2009, and 2.6 percent a year later), while there was a 
slight rise in investment and real estate credit, by 0.9 and 3.1 percent in December 2009, 
respectively. In 2010 investment loans maintained a rising trend and grew by 2.1 percent, 
while property loans slumped by 5 percent. However, both investment and real estate lending 
is by virtue of its long-term characteristics more stable and sustainable. Sanguine plot of their 
value might therefore result from the activation of next stages of financing, while the credits 
themselves had been accepted yet before the crisis broke out. It is yet to be seen whether these 
levels will drop in the coming future following the lagged effects of contractionary steps. 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 3. Corporate lending volume in 
Poland broken down by loan’s 
maturity. 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 4. Corporate lending volume in 
Poland broken down by loan’s 
purpose. 
 
A number of experts point out that the preservation of the 2006-2008 rates of growth in 
lending seemed to be practically unfeasible, because of both limited sources of financing and 
unavoidable turnaround in prosperity (see Zaleska, 2010). The share of non-performing loans 
heaved by 79.2 percent (from 13,5 billion PLN to a shocking 24,3 billion PLN) and their 
share in banks’ portfolio boosted from 6.1 to 11.4 percent. As a result of the above mentioned 
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tendencies, the structure of banks’ lending portfolios changed dramatically. In 2009 corporate 
credit accounted for 33.9 percent of total lending, as compared with 37.5 percent in the 
previous year. As problems accumulated economists stood up to warn against possible 
payment gridlocks – as banks were reluctant not only to grant new investment loans, but also 
short term working capital loans (Samcik, 2009; Zaleska, 2010). 
The end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 brought some weak symptoms of revival, as 
banks loosened their lending policies. These measures concerned credit terms and conditions 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (later referred to as SMEs). But banks continued to be 
reluctant on long term engagements, preferring short term lending. 
In 2010, the situation more or less resembled a deadlock, caused by the mismatch 
between supply side and demand side preferences. Those who might be issued a credit, did 
not need to apply for it, whereas those who desperately needed it, did not meet banks’ 
sophisticated criteria. The press wrote that it is “credit clench” which substituted credit crunch 
(Twaróg, 2010). In response to this situation, enterprises started to accumulate capital and 
either postpone investments or finance them with their own funds. Banks, on the contrary, 
struggled to drain the swamp of unwanted excess liquidity by crediting local government 
entities (Olczak, 2010). A deficient substitute in the long run. Moreover, it was during the 
crisis when banks understood how important it is to take care of long term relationships with 
their clients. This “enlightenment” gave rise to the so-called “war on deposits”, in effect of 
which the most successful credit institutions accrued decent funds and, though still having 
considerable risk aversion, simultaneously exhibited increased “risk appetite”. But as of 
January 2011, average margin for corporate credits amounted 2 percent, with the lowest ones 
of approximately 1.5 percent. It was still a serious worsening, as margins at the level of about 
1 percent were common yet in 2008 (Olczak, 2011).  
However, some prominent economists, like Jacek Osiński, deny the term “credit 
crunch” when describing the situation in Poland since 2009. Osiński benchmarks the current 
crisis with the previous ones in Poland and CEE, which were greater in magnitude. This line 
of reasoning is supported by Jadwiga Zaręba who argues that a “minor adjustment” is the 
phrase we should use. (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 5-6) 
Bratkowski, given the foundations of credit contraction in Poland, which were distinct 
from those in the Western economies, suggests that this reduction does not “deserve” a label 
of a credit crunch (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 15). True, Poland experienced neither 
upsetting banking sector nationalization (see the United Kingdom), nor equally troublesome 
Fortis Bank bailout (see Belgium, France and the Netherlands), not even mentioning the 
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monstrous American life buoy embodied by the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
worth 700 bn USD (Gadomski, 2009). Bratkowski concludes his interpretation with a 
somewhat controversial statement that even if this was a credit crunch, it was exactly what the 
Polish economy needed at that time, since the slowdown indirectly contributed to the 
reduction of disequilibria in international trade and re-appreciation of zloty (Bratkowski and 
Myjak, 2009: 15). 
A home-grown analysis of the banking sector’s response to the crisis-related 
externalities was articulated by Richard Mbewe (2011). According to him, what was the most 
prevailing fear was the fact that these are foreign institutions which are owners of most Polish 
banks. Moreover, these institutions are based in the countries quite heavily touched by the 
crisis. Nevertheless, the data very strongly contradicts the gossip that parent banks drained 
their daughters from capital (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 10). While interbank market faded 
out, the foreign source of liquidity not only did not dry out completely, but actually 
flourished. There was a clear and most probably not a spurious correlation between the 
lending levels and the inflow of foreign funds. Polish-based assets were not relocated abroad 
to rescue jeopardized parent companies. The following reasons are thought to be decisive: 
- Good performance of regulatory bodies, both on behalf of the National Bank of Poland 
(later referred to as NBP) and the KNF 
- Poland was granted a 22 billion USD line of credit by International Monetary Fund, on 
event of an unexpected turbulence – the line was nonetheless never used 
- Although Polish banks are parts of global networks, they usually do not play a part in 
global transactions made by their parent institutions 
 
1.3. Stylized facts 
 
Typically, after a negative stimulant infects with the economy, the anatomy of a 
corporate credit crunch, intuitively, reads as follows. Households’ spending tends to be lower, 
due to the emerging risks of unemployment or lowered income. Therefore, firms’ diminished 
investment demand is the aftermath of reduced consumer confidence – corporates are unsure 
whether they will be able to market their goods or services. Deliberate curbs on borrowing are 
neither the most probable, nor the most harmful cause of credit crunch. The abridged 
inclination to borrow may come out of quite severe circumstances, e.g. the deteriorated 
creditworthiness of an enterprise, which does not allow for a desired amount of credit. The 
vital part in this framework is played by the accelerators that account for systemic risk. For 
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instance, as exemplified by Murphy (2009: 101), a ‘forced liquidation of a bankrupt firm's 
assets may cause losses in fair value for other firms – and losses of confidence in the system 
as a whole affecting funding’. 
In corporate credit, though, demand-side factors are less prevailed, as enterprises are 
usually interested in acquiring additional liquidity. This is in line with Wdowiński’s (2011) 
finding that increased NPLs decrease the demand for consumer credit, but respective 
deterioration in corporate credit does not produce analogical reaction of corporates. As a side 
note, one may reminder that it is usually assumed that the term “credit crunch” is used to 
describe a contraction of credit, which results solely from supply-side elements. This is in 
accordance with the definition of Bernanke and Lown (1991: 207), which states that a credit 
crunch is ‘a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans, holding constant both 
the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrower’. Consequently, we would have 
to invent another expression for demand-led credit retrenchment, e.g. aversion to borrow. 
However, what if the supply curve shifts leftwards for risky loans, but rightwards for good 
decent opportunities? Conceivably, this is the situation  we are witnessing. The set of good 
credits is limited, though, therefore the cuts are made on the inferior set of subprime 
exposures. Whatever the definition, Murphy (2009: 283) supplements the credit crunch 
picture, broadening it by the inclusion of accompanying phenomena: an increase in credit 
spreads, an increase in risk aversion, and a flight to high quality liquid assets by investors. All 
of the above is observed in Poland in recent years. 
However, according to the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (2010: 13) the 
demand-led factors were central. The available data concerning the policy of domestic 
enterprises indicate the reduction of both firms applying for credit (from 38 percent in 2Q 
2008 to 19 percent in 2Q 2009), and entities planning to do so (from 36 to 25 percent, 
respectively). The regulatory body seems to overlook, however, that the reduced demand 
might be prompted by the increased cost of credit, already known to (or anticipated by) 
enterprises before submitting an application. Such a mechanism, if valid here, is in fact a grist 
to the mill of the adverse selection of borrowers. Firms looking forward to implement high-
yield, but risky projects, are more likely to apply and receive external financing, than those 
with less profitable, but safer ventures, which may not allow for an expensive loan. 
Paradoxically, the latter should be preferred by banks in times of turmoil. But being aware of 
the asymmetry of information, banks increase not only the interest rates, but also the value of 
required collateral, thus making less endowed firms still more worse-off and deprived. 
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Concurrently, supply-side, regulatory and behavioral components of this stylized model 
come into action. During the crisis, central banks are more likely to promote austere monetary 
policy, which leads to the decrease of total money supply. As the interest rates grow and 
monetary base shrinks, banks are unable to raise as much funds as beforehand. As Stephen 
Foley (2007) noted bluntly, ‘if access to cheap debt is cut off permanently, it will mean an end 
to all the activity that has been funded by the cheap debt’. Moreover, banks still need to meet 
the requirement of Basel II capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which means that the deterioration 
of assets’ quality demands more capital in place, and accordingly, more cautious lending. 
What is more, banks, like enterprises, may not be sure about future prosperity, especially if 
sentiment indices are falling. Furthermore, a “confidence crisis” in the interbank market 
hampers fundraising capabilities, along with the wholesale funding becoming challenged by 
fussy providers, sensitive to falls in the credit risk profile of the institutions to which they 
make these funds available. For instance, Hempell and Sørensen (2010: 21), focusing on the 
2007-2009 financial crisis in the euro area, suggest that ‘strains on banks’ liquidity positions 
and their access to market financing contributed significantly to the slowdown in corporate 
lending, whereas such effects were not significant prior to the crisis’. 
All of the above mentioned leads to the cut-back of financial institutions’ lending 
activities. However, this wide-ranging landscape needs to be augmented when certain banks 
are analyzed in micro scale. Explicitly, individual banks characteristics may either amplify or 
reduce the degree by which a given bank is influenced by external dynamics. These 
characteristics include: shareholding, employed financing strategy, securities held, and the 
quality of loan portfolio. Limited data sets, however, will not allow us to pursue such an in-
depth approach, but some aggregative components will be employed. 
 
1.4. Stylized hypotheses 
 
In the developed markets the credit contraction was determined by several factors, out 
of which some are not translatable to the Polish scene. One of them was lack of liquidity. The 
banks which predominantly happened to encounter this kind of drawback were known to have 
suffered heavy securitization-related losses and became vulnerable to fearful depositors’ 
panic, as well as to the disappointment of wholesale funding providers. The credit institutions 
affected by the crunch were therefore traders of securities backed by subprime mortgages, 
either their important packagers or biggest investors in them (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2008). This does not apply to Poland. 
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Neither does the banking sector consolidation, which until recently used to be 
frequently associated with reduced small business lending. The conventional justification was 
that the consolidation within the banking industry puts opaque small firms, relying mostly on 
relationship lending, at a disadvantage, since the “soft” information gets lost during the 
merger. Confronted with the facts, the most recent results demonstrate some deal of 
ambiguity, as offsetting external effects may arise following the intensification in volume of 
M&A transactions. (Berger, Molyneux and Wilson, 2010: 532-541 and 863) 
However, the aforementioned argument is somewhat reasonably reinforced by 
Grodzicki, Hałaj and Żochowski (2010: 18), who prove that large banks in Poland exhibit a 
tendency to lend less than small banks, and maintain that it might be an aftermath of less 
aggressive strategies. 
There were some economists claiming that the decline in domestic corporate lending 
was partially understandable as lending volumes in previous years were unsustainably high 
(Jankowiak, 2008). One may find it hard to digest such an idea, since the financial depth ratio 
(loans to GDP), what has already been mentioned in one of the previous sections, keeps on 
indicating quite substantial underdevelopment in relation to the Western Europe. Bratkowski 
in Bratkowski and Myjak (2009: 8) affirms it is obvious that a year-on-year pace of growth in 
lending may not persist on the level of 30 percent in the long run, even in the emerging 
market. A shift was unavoidable. Otherwise, macroeconomic stability would have been 
endangered. But Bratkowski spots also that a decline in corporate lending induced excessively 
deep correction. If so, the corporate lending seems to be relatively more sluggish in prosperity 
and more volatile in downturn, which is sub-optimal from the macroeconomic point of view. 
In contrast, Haselmann and Wachtel (2009) persuade that banks based in transition states 
indeed shifted their asset portfolios towards mortgages and consumer credit, but small 
businesses are still financially constrained in terms of the access to bank lending. 
Credit facilities play, or at least should do so, a significant role in accelerating 
economic growth and achieving convergent lending market size. Having said this, and 
accepting the importance of the subject, construction of the brake that reduced available credit 
in 2009 should be discovered and understood. The following sub-chapters are thought to 
provide a certain deal of theoretical considerations, stylized facts and gut feeling concerning 
the interactions between the underlying variables, performance of which is thought to be non-
negligible for credit institutions. 
Some variables typically associated with credit volume, were dropped due to the 
suspicion of inversed causality (e.g. investments, European Union funds transmission). It does 
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not mean, though, that the risk of inversed causality has been defeated. In fact it is still here, 
but the chosen specification of the econometric model will to some extent address this risk. 
Let’s now check whether they were borrowers whose balance sheets distorted, or the 
lenders did not have their pockets deep enough, or the monetary and regulatory authorities 
forged inadequate policies. Note that only the fundamental and theory-consistent variables are 
dealt with in this chapter, whereas the next one is dedicated to behavioral impacts. 
 
1.4.1. Demand-side determinants 
 
The hypothesis of reduced demand is one of the easiest to put forward, but hardly 
traceable. If credible, it would also be the most convenient for banks, which would no longer 
be blamed for decimating the money supply. However, to relieve banks of this burden will not 
be like waving a magic wand. As stated in the theoretical considerations, it is usually assumed 
that corporations are always willing to absorb every amount of credit made available to them. 
There are serious caveats of whether demand-side factors coerced the contraction of corporate 
credit. 
An advanced level of scrutiny and skepticism is indispensable while debating the 
demand-side determinants. First, only effective demand, i.e. the demand which is underpinned 
by appropriately convincing financial standing and creditworthiness, should be taken under 
consideration. Second, the corporate credit is not a homogenous good. The drivers for short-
term and long-term, investment and operating, corporate and small business loans are highly 
different. Third, customer preferences, with regard to the sources of liabilities, are dynamic 
and may be correlated not only with the respective funding costs, but also with the type of 
desired credit. Complying with all of the above criteria is hardly possible, due to numerous 
problems in measurement. Therefore, as far as the demand-side is concerned, the researcher is 
doomed to use inevitably flawed proxies. As a result, a certain portion of the demand-side 
investigation is made within the third chapter. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Borrowers flew to foreign markets 
 
While the companies were unable to meet stricter banks’ criteria, and terms and 
conditions of credit, they might try a chance abroad. The question is whether the declined 
availability of credit on the domestic market was a sufficient stimulus to search for borrowing 
opportunities in a foreign country. Moreover, as most of the developed economies have been 
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hit harder than Poland, it remains highly doubtful that circumstances abroad were more 
favorable for Polish firms as compared to domestic ones. The final caveat with regard to this 
hypothesis is that foreign funding was in major part only available to corporations, leaving 
small and medium-sized enterprises’ needs unmet. 
It is evident that until mid-2008 the expansion of borrowing abroad was more dynamic 
than borrowing domestically. However, this previously uninterrupted growth had lost its 
momentum even before the first signs of domestic crunch became noticeable. This is most 
likely the consequence of the fact that the crisis had already been omnipresent in the 
developed economies by that time. However, a declining trend was not formed and Polish 
agents continued to borrow abroad, however, almost perfect interchangeability is seen with 
regard to domestic and foreign borrowing in the short run. If domestic credit is less accessible, 
foreign lending makes up for this, otherwise the opposite holds. Nevertheless, there are too 
few details to determine the factual interconnection of these two variables, especially because 
of the following data set inefficiencies: 
- Quarterly reporting, instead of monthly 
- No break-down with regard to type of agent (corporation, SME, others) 
- No break-down with regard to the purpose of the loan (investments, trade) 
- No break-down with regard to the maturity of the loan (short or long term). 
The chart below seems to ultimately undermine the proposed hypothesis. Foreign 
indebtedness in the non-government non-banking sector has been on constant, rather 
uninterrupted growth since 1999. In 2008, when corporate lending fared still pretty well in 
Poland, foreign debt surprisingly skyrocketed, too. But the volume of foreign debt failed to 
grow even slightly in 2009 and 2010. Fluctuations that happened in this period are probably a 
derivative of tempestuous behavior of currency exchange rates, following the depreciation of 
zloty. To sum up, corporate lending from non-residents is undeniably more parallel than 
counter-cyclical to the domestic corporate lending volumes. 
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Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 5. Foreign indebtedness in the non-government non-banking sector, as compared with 
the banking sector (for comparison purposes). 
 
Hypothesis 2. Borrowers took advantage of alternative sources of capital 
 
The hypothesis that enterprises abandoned bank credit to the advantage of alternative 
funding is fragile, identically as the previous one. Corporate bonds, mezzanine, leasing, initial 
public offering, private equity or venture capital, business angels, European Union’s funds 
and trade credit – all of these are possible substitutes. As the interplay between corporate 
lending and the above mentioned surrogates has not been frequently researched by scholars, 
some sort of a Gedankenexperiment will be useful before proceeding to the further 
exploration on this subject. 
First, a domestic credit crunch in Poland is not likely to make a positive shift in a 
venture capital or private equity cycles. Although there is some weak evidence on that in the 
United States (Richtel, 2007; Gardner, 2008), this may not be directly transferred to the 
domestic market, which is roughly thousand times smaller than overseas. But regardless of 
geographical location, only relatively few cutting-edge start-ups or early stage companies may 
benefit from VC funding. By the same token, it will apply to other forms of high risk capital. 
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Second, the observable growth of EU-financed investment projects may not be a valid 
cause for domestic credit contraction. In fact, it should be rather more supportive than 
destructive to corporate lending, since the EU most often co-finances only a portion of the 
accepted projects’ required funding. The remainder has to be covered by an applicant, which, 
induces further lending. Such initiatives are somewhat a blessing for a bank, since they are 
considered safer (Szymborska-Sutton, 2011). 
Third, there is no evidence that the credit crunch encourages firms to go public. This is 
also a fairly intuitive inference, as company’s valuation during the uncertainty in the global 
marketplace is not as appealing as it would have been during the prosperity. There were 24 
market debuts at the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in 2007, 61 in 2008, and only 26 in 
2009. In 2010, though, a record-breaker of 86 has been achieved. Nevertheless, in the year of 
the deepest crunch only 26 companies went public, which rather does not support the 
hypothesis of increased fundraising on the stock exchange. Moreover, the table below 
suggests that, on the one hand, the ratio of market capitalization to nominal gross domestic 
product (GDP) in Poland in 2008 still underperformed in comparison with the developed 
economies and, on the other hand, even an increased volume of debuts may still be attributed 
to the catch-up effect. What is more, the stock exchange is still considerably posh and 
exclusive. The smallest companies are generally unable to tap capital markets, although some 
of them may carry out a public offering through a recently opened, WSE-owned, alternative 
and more inclusive trading system called New Connect. 
 
Table 1.  Market capitalization of EU27 Member States, Russian Federation and Turkey, 
as a percentage of nominal GDP in 2008 
 
 Country Market value of 
publicly traded 
shares (31 Dec 
2008) in m USD 
Nominal GDP 
(2008) in m USD 
Market 
capitalization to 
nominal GDP 
(percentage) 
1 Luxembourg 66,460 57,639 115.30 
2 Russian Federation 1,322,000 1,666,951 79.31 
3 United Kingdom 1,852,000 2,662,652 69.55 
4 Spain 946,100 1,594,466 59.34 
5 Finland 154,400 270,479 57.08 
6 France 1,492,000 2,854,229 52.27 
7 Sweden 252,500 487,576 51.79 
8 Malta  3,572 7,449 47.96 
9 Netherlands 387,900 872,865 44.44 
10 Slovenia 22,100 54,395 40.63 
11 Denmark 131,500 340,801 38.59 
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12 Belgium 167,400 505,374 33.12 
13 Cyprus 7,955 24,910 31.93 
14 Germany 1,108,000 3,634,526 30.49 
15 Portugal 68,710 251,833 27.28 
16 Greece 90,400 350,300 25.81 
17 Ireland 61,700 266,329 23.17 
18 Italy 520,900 2,296,629 22.68 
19 Czech Republic 48,850 216,084 22.61 
20 Austria 72,300 414,671 17.44 
21 Bulgaria 8,858 51,825 17.09 
22 Poland 90,230 528,324 17.08 
23 Turkey 117,900 730,337 16.14 
24 Hungary 18,580 154,668 12.01 
25 Romania 19,920 200,071 9.96 
26 Estonia 1,950 23,517 8.29 
27 Lithuania 3,625 47,129 7.69 
28 Slovakia 5,079 98,464 5.16 
29 Latvia 1,609 33,849 4.75 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, World Bank. 
 
Fourth, yearly reports on Poland’s leasing market (Polish Leasing Association, 2010) 
indicate that, in terms of proportions, the decline in business was even profounder in some 
sectors than the slump in bank corporate lending. However, the initial recovery took place yet 
in 4Q 2009, and since leasing volumes are sometimes considered as a leading indicator of the 
economic performance, it is fairly optimistic. Leasing was thus a likely remedy for some 
enterprises, alleviating their troublesome access to liquidity. Still limited adoption of this 
source of funding in Poland precludes us, though, from using this variable in further research, 
because its macro impact is expected to be negligible. 
Fifth, although a number of commentators claimed the remarkable growth of corporate 
bonds market, it is available only for biggest players, able to offer investors a considerable 
stock of bonds. While some corporations could afford corporate bonds issuance, the 
remaining 99 percent of the Polish firms might, at the most, approach a knee-breaking loan 
shark from just round the corner. 
Consequently, in most cases SMEs can do little to combat the crunch and are likely to 
be smashed disproportionally hard during the contraction. As noted by Berger, Molyneux and 
Wilson (2010: 531), ‘small businesses are engines of growth in the modern economy’, but it 
is bank lending which ‘provides much of the fuel for this growth’. This finding is generally in 
line with Havrylchyk (2005: 62), maintaining that ‘market finance is unavailable to majority 
of companies’. So are cross-border lending and inter-company loans, available only to blue 
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chips or companies with foreign direct investments, respectively. Greater bank-dependency of 
SMEs is confirmed also by Wdowiński (2011: 3). In conclusion, shift of lending preferences 
was the case, but its scale and impact had to be meager. 
 
1.4.2. Supply-side determinants 
 
Hypothesis 3. Banks were restructuring their portfolios 
 
Switching to more secure types of credit and reinforcing one’s market position in the 
safer segments clearly seem to be the mainstream survival strategies of Polish banks. 
Although the shares of consumer loans and other loans did not significantly change, housing 
loans quite fast overweighed corporate ones. Mortgages were considered less risky. True, 
consumer loans proved to be even riskier than SME lending, but the risk premium remained 
disproportionately high. Therefore, banks still did not have sufficient incentives to reduce 
their exposure for cash loans. 
The incredible pace of the underlying switch poses a threat that estimations utilizing 
this time series will fail to capture this effect, since previously for many years, both types of 
credit exhibited positive collinearity. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 6. Total outstanding amount of mortgage and housing loans, as compared with total 
outstanding amount of corporate loans. 
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Hypothesis 4. Boosting impaired loans ratios treated as a red flag 
 
Impaired loans ratio skyrocketed, causing much distress among banking sector. It was 
probably a red flag for banks to pull the emergency brake. On the one hand, non-performing 
loans share (NPL) doubled between October 2008 and May 2010 (however, in the meantime, 
methodology has been slightly changed by the National Bank of Poland). On the other hand, 
the ratio used to be even more alarming in the earlier years. However, if we assume the 
existence of adaptive expectations, imposing a pressure on low NPL levels, this variable may 
still be significant at least in the short term. The importance of this factor is confirmed by 
many scholars, including Wdowiński (2011: 7). 
The question is whether only corporate NPLs mattered. Richard Mbewe (2009) utters 
that irresponsible consumers are to blame. According to him, the credit crunch was stirred by 
individuals not able to service their own cash loans, and thus undermining their creditors’ 
positions. Although it is certain that banks suffer from over-indebtedness of individuals, it is 
also true that a direct link between the corporate lending volume and the quality of consumer 
lending portfolio is not so straightforwardly explainable. 
 
Hypothesis 5. A shortfall in deposits reduced money supply 
 
Most national regulators broadened deposit insurance providing safety net for 
individuals, guaranteed banks’ borrowing and injected debt or equity capital into leading 
banks. In Poland, just the first one of the above mentioned measures was enacted. But even if 
it had not been the case, the pertaining hypothesis would have seemed rather implausible, as 
the Polish banking sector is known for its tight spot concerning excess liquidity. Even a 
reasonable decrease in money supply might turn out to be immaterial to the banks’ lending 
committees. Research, and now also the evidence, show that even under excess cash, 
increased lending may not be taken for granted. For instance, despite unprecedented monetary 
stimulus, the flow of credit in the United States remained constrained. Artificially improved, 
but decent fundamentals have been beleaguered by hoarding instincts of major American 
banks. As summarized by Henry (2010), a steady decline in the ratio of cash to business loans 
– from around 60 percent in the 1970s to a low of 20 percent in late 2008 – has reversed 
sharply over the 2009. According to Federal Reserve data, banks squirreled away an all-time 
high of 98 cents in cash for every dollar of existing corporate loans during the week of 
January 13th. 
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Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 7. The funding gap is defined here as the result of a subtraction: (total receivables from 
the non-financial sector minus total receivables from the non-financial sector 12 
months ago) minus (total liabilities to the non-financial sector minus total liabilities 
to the non-financial sector 12 months ago). In short, the output describes how much 
faster is the growth in lending, as compared with the growth in deposits, in nominal 
terms. 
 
The above chart proves that funding gap as regards the Polish zloty, increased 
considerably throughout 2007, which supposedly may determine banks’ reluctance to lend in 
the next years. Probably the one valuable finding that transpires here is the shrinking rate of 
growth in lending in 2008. Although we are far from considering 2008 as the year of crunch, 
it must be admitted that some vital force has been pulling the lending down. As soon as the 
problem is realized, the solution is found. This was reinforced currency lending which made 
up for all that difference. The foreign currencies’ funding gap turned negative in 2009, which 
means a truly sharp decline, since the deposits in foreign currencies were scarce, while the 
lending in foreign currencies skyrockceted. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Crisis of confidence in the interbank market 
 
Banks lend and borrow liquid reserves kept on their current accounts in the central 
banks. They consist of obligatory reserves and the assets accrued voluntarily. This is why the 
market enables liquid credit institutions to lend their funds to banks that struggle to make ends 
meet. The interest rate (Warsaw Interbank Borrowing rate, WIBOR) is determined by supply 
and demand. This cost of funding has increased rapidly in 2008, i.e. much before the 
contraction became visible in the data sets. In the effect, interbank market came to a halt, as 
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the turnout has fallen down from nearly 6,5 billion PLN at the end of 2007 to less than 2 
billion PLN at the beginning of 2009. 
This mechanism was skillfully depicted by Murphy (2009: 105). Knowing that liquidity 
directly affects repo funding and that repos are only a safe form of lending if the lender can be 
sure that the collateral is reliable, if the collateral becomes illiquid, then it is hard to value. It 
is hard to be confident that the loan is fully collateralized. The author punchlines that 
interbank repo funding therefore tends to dry up when bond liquidity falls. In the Polish case, 
a pure supposition that the other banks’ assets may be somehow contaminated sufficed. 
Referring to Szpunar (2010: 9), surplus liquidity in the Polish financial sector exists, but it is 
‘concentrated in a small group of banks’ and its re-distribution through the interbank market 
is vital. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 8. The dynamics of interbank market captured by interest rate and turnover. 
 
POLONIA is calculated as an average weighted of the rates and amounts of transactions 
provided by the market players. It currently covers up to 57 percent of the concluded 
interbank transactions and constitutes a valuable source of information underlying the NBP’s 
policy on domestic operations. The recurring inference, flowing from this figure, consistent 
with the previous one on funding gap, is that 2008 was a crucial period, in which fundamental 
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deteriorations in the system should be detected. An immense slump in interbank trade 
happened in 2008, whereas the consecutive years mark its slow but persistent reconstruction, 
supported by the low interest rate environment. 
Richard Mbewe (2009) says that banks may have ‘a desire to accumulate as much cash 
as possible in order to be well positioned when the market thrives’. This would be quite 
innovative premise, indicating that neither austerity nor risk aversion placed the most sinister 
stamp on banks’ low-key policies, but instead of it, lucid business calculations were in place. 
The analogous behavior occurred even in the United States. A combination of weak 
demand from borrowers and risk aversion from lenders is to blame. In particular, banks are 
building cash buffers in anticipation of stringent new rules on reserve requirements, leverage 
ratios and the like. Annual growth in the balance of existing business loans has fallen for eight 
consecutive months. The credit crunch is far from over. 
Münchau (2009) indicates that banks were vigilant, because they knew their own 
positions. Thus, they suspected other banks were in the same trouble, or even worse. Despite 
abounding liquidity in the system, a funding impasse emerged. Brunnermeier (2009: 95) has 
no doubts on that: ‘the troubles in the interbank lending market in 2007–2008 are a textbook 
example of precautionary hoarding by individual banks’. It was due to skyrocketing 
uncertainty about own funding needs and the vagueness of whether the interbank market 
would give a hand in troubles or not. 
 
1.4.3. Impediments related to monetary policy and regulations 
 
In his exhaustive publication, Jean-Charles Rochet (2007) argues that banking crises are 
largely amplified, or even provoked, by political interference. If he had completed his work 
after the breakout of the current worldwide crisis, he would probably have had additional 
evidence to elaborate on his standpoint to make it even more convincing. Nevertheless, this 
causation again seems to be rather irrelevant in the domestic case, at least in the realm of 
corporate credit. With hindsight, this assessment is relatively easy, but in the gloomy 
beginnings of 2009 it was not that obvious. Back then, CEOs of two biggest Polish banks, 
PKO BP and Pekao SA, stood up in joint effort to extort relaxation in monetary measures 
from the NBP (Warsaw Voice, 2009). Having developed bleak scenario for 2009, Jerzy 
Pruski and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki discredited the effectiveness of rate cuts and short-term 
liquidity measures, and offered new medicines designed to mitigate the credit crunch risk. 
They insisted that the central bank should:  
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- Cut mandatory reserves (reserves requirement rate) from 3.5 percent to 2 percent 
- Buy back bonds set to mature in 2012 
- Accept new forms of collateral from commercial banks, including credit liabilities. 
In this context, as the above mentioned demands have not come into force in the 
proposed form, one must admit that even if the monetary and regulatory measures were not 
contractionary, they were also not carelessly expansionary. Let’s make a short round-up of the 
NBP’s, KNF’s and government-led deeds that could potentially sway corporate lending. 
 
Hypothesis 7. Contractionary monetary policy 
 
Challenged by the crisis, central banks all over the affected area found themselves 
between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, expansionary measures might sustain 
growth, but might also propagate the risk on yet stretched financial markets. On the other 
hand, macroprudential steps might ensure security, but at the cost of aggravated crunch. 
However, the facts indicate that the current central banks’ orthodoxy is rather to cut rates to 
ludicrously low levels, whenever the economy goes into trouble. This time it might not be that 
straightforward, provided that the experts’ outlooks about what potential damages the global 
crisis would cause were discordant. According to Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011: 20), there is 
no single recommendation for the developing countries’ monetary policy in crisis. ‘Some 
economists advocate an increase in interest rates to defend the domestic currency and attract 
foreign capital back into the country, whereas others encourage the opposite action to 
stimulate the economy’. In Poland, judging by interest rate policy, the central bank did what it 
took to avoid reduced money supply and credit availability. 
The credit channel mechanism of monetary policy describes the theory that monetary 
authority’s policy changes affect both the issuance of credit to borrowers as well as credit 
availability from lenders, which in turn affects the real economy. 
The traditional framework educates that monetary policy influences the economy 
exclusively through the interest rate channel. Restrictive monetary policy increases the cost of 
capital, thus reducing firms’ investment activity and consumers’ spending, which 
consequently reduces aggregate demand and the inflationary pressure. However, such an 
approach is not comprehensive any more. The credit channel is viewed as an indirect 
amplification mechanism that works in tandem with the conventional monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The credit channel view holds that monetary policy adjustments that 
affect the short-term interest rate are amplified by affecting the cost of raising additional 
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capital by banks (see Łyziak, 2001: 4). Wdowiński (2011: 6) also suggests that the lending 
channel rather supplements the conventional mode of monetary transmission rather than 
represents itself an independent mechanism. The bank lending channel theorizes that changes 
in monetary policy will shift the supply of intermediated credit. If the supply of loanable 
funds banks possess is affected for some reason, then so too should be the borrowers who are 
dependent on banks’ funds for business operations. 
It has been widely accepted that constraints on the wholesale funding of bank balance 
sheets amplify the transmission of monetary policy through the lending channel. Although the 
strength and the speed of adjustment of different economic variables to policy makers’ 
decisions remain vague and country-specific, lending channel hypothesis may not be dropped 
in this analysis. Proponents of the existence of the bank lending channel argue that it is 
efficient provided that at least some banks are liquidity constrained. ‘Following a reduction in 
reserves and bank deposits, constrained banks are unable to substitute wholesale market 
funding for lost reservable deposits and so must reduce their lending by more than 
unconstrained banks’ (Milne and Wood, 2009: 7). This may later spill-over if the liquidity 
constrained banks are the source of capital also for other lending institutions. All in all, with 
the bank lending channel, the contraction in credit is larger than with the conventional interest 
rate channel alone. 
According to another reasoning, a contractionary shift in monetary policy increases 
external premium (e.g. through the increased collateral valuation), alters the cost of credit and, 
consequently, real expenditures, thus amplifying the interest rate signal (Bernanke and 
Gertler: 1995). If so, even an excess of monetary stringency would not be one-sidedly harmful 
for borrowers. 
The logic of the Polish banking sector cast doubts on the efficiency of bank lending 
channel. Since the level of internationalization within the sector is considerable, the National 
Bank of Poland has only limited influence on the lending institutions policies. 
Ewa Wróbel in Grabek et al. (2008) states that the adjustment of Polish banks’ interest 
rates to market interest rates is sluggish and incomplete, due to imperfect competition (banks 
are “price makers” rather than “price takers”), menu costs and uncertainty with regard to the 
durability of current central bank’s stance. Pietrzyk (2005: 4) takes a step further, by saying 
that the lending channel in Poland virtually does not exist due to the excess liquidity 
prevailing in the domestic banking sector. Even the increased purchase of government bonds 
will not reduce the bank’s liquidity to an extent which would lead to the reduction in credit 
issuance in that bank. The author argues that it is real economy, i.e. overall prosperity, 
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enterprises’ financial standing or non-performing loans ratio, which impact bank lending 
policies. 
As for corporate loans, an empirical study in Poland for the period 1995-2006 indicates 
that the adjustment took place very fast (one month and a half) and was full. Chmielewski 
(2004) points out that the source of differences in speed of interest rate adjustments lay in 
banks’ individual characteristics. His findings are that the banks with loan portfolios of lower 
quality, as well as those with lower capital adequacy ratios, happen to adjust corporate interest 
rates faster and stronger than the banks with less risky portfolios or healthier capital structure. 
Schmitz (2004: 26) insisted to revise the usual assumptions taken in the literature, that a 
small, less liquid or less capitalized bank reacts more strongly to the monetary policy change 
than a bank with a high value of the respective bank characteristic. Furthermore, affiliated 
banks or foreign-owned banks should show a weaker reaction to restrictive monetary policy 
since they can access internal or foreign capital markets. Indeed, controlling for the banks’ 
ownership structure is crucial for understanding whether the monetary policy is efficient or 
deficient in a particular case. The banking sector in the EU new member countries can be 
subdivided into two groups along the ownership structure. In particular the group of foreign-
owned banks adjusts more strongly their lending after an increase in euro area interest rates 
than their domestic-owned competitors. Apart from it, most of other bank characteristics 
demonstrate insignificant statistics or yields significant but only weak response. 
Besides, Milne (2009: 35) puts another issue under consideration. It has been widely 
accepted that constraints on the wholesale funding of bank balance sheets strengthen the 
transmission of monetary policy. In fact it is ambiguous, with an amplifying effect only when 
a tightening of monetary policy leads to a net outflow of funds, i.e. deposit outflow exceeding 
the decline of lending, in constrained banks. Otherwise the bank lending channel attenuates 
the impact of monetary policy. 
The most recent broad-based empirical study by Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez 
(2010) claims, rightly, that ‘the whole monetary transmission mechanism has changed as a 
result of deregulation, financial innovation and increasing role of institutional investors’. 
Changing business models and the intense use of securitization as a funding asset, call for 
revisiting the way in which the lending channel works. This is a justified statement, but under 
Polish conditions such financial innovations did not have a decisive impact. 
The very hypothesis that a central bank forged a contractionary policy is highly 
disputable. It seems that this time central banks all over the world orchestrated growth-
oriented maneuvers. When the crisis broke out, central bankers anticipated that the most vital 
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challenge is to protect the real economy from shortage of credit. As interbank market died out 
because of trust deficit, the availability of credit slumped and might fuel a domino effect. 
Central banks intervened to provide liquidity, seeing that the interbank market had malformed. 
Although in the Polish sector these phenomena did not show up with such intensity, it 
exhibits a general trend followed by central banks these days. If so, one may ask adversely: 
have excessively low interest rates preceded the credit bubbles and caused a crunch? The 
judicious answer is: true, monetary policy stance is a plausible candidate to blame, but this 
simple time coincidence is not yet a proof. No one may assure that the property bubble, which 
underlay the meltdown, would not have happened, if interest rates had been set higher. 
The bank lending channel is not the only issue applicable when discussing the monetary 
policy impact. The financial authorities were sometimes criticized for failing to harmonize 
various interest rates in the market. Anna Zielińska-Głębocka, a member of the Monetary 
Policy Council (RPP) underlines the fact that since liquidity in the Polish banking sector is 
already vast, high interest rates on loans and clogged lending channel descend purely from the 
risk assessment made by banks (Chądzyński and Zielińska-Głębocka, 2010). According to 
her, it should KNF’s focal point to take care of banks’ simultaneous ability to meet regulatory 
criteria and revive credit availability. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland, money.pl. 
 
Figure 9. Various interest rates, prevalent in the Polish financial sector from January 2005 to 
January 2011, indicating the growing discrepancy between the market interest rate 
and the official NBP-quoted rate. 
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The above graph shows that yet in the end of 2007 spreads became unusually high, 
which means that the cost of credits had to go up too. However, the highest average spread 
falls on 2009. Then, POLONIA rate for overnight deposits dropped abnormally low, which 
has additionally shaken the state of equilibrium. It has to be underlined that POLONIA is 
purely factual (ex post) interest rate under which real transactions have been concluded, while 
WIBOR is just theoretical price (ex ante), not entailing the fact that any trade has been made 
under this quotation. This additionally authenticates the inference about the enormity of 
spread, which leads to the conclusion that credits were sold at a very expensive price. In 
response to it, the NBP has recently placed a commitment to keep volatile POLONIA rates 
closer to the reference rate, which would be convenient for market players (Wilkowicz, 
2011b). 
Another possible measure influencing banks’ behavior is the reserve requirement rate. 
Central bank is very cautious and reluctant to alter it, as it is believed to be overpoweringly 
efficient. This rate has been remaining unchanged for almost seven years, since the national 
bank decided to lower it. It was reestablished at 3.50 percent at the beginning of 2011. It is 
also potentially worthwhile to mention that many researchers underline the existence of yet 
another pass-through channel by which monetary policy may moderately influence. It is a 
risk-taking channel, first defined by Borio and Zhu (2008), indicating that banks are willing to 
take on more risk, even not being compensated by the increased risk premium. This concept is 
supply driven and is believed to explain differences in banks’ responses to monetary policy 
shocks, provided that banks’ portfolios of customers are similar. The risk-taking channel is 
confirmed e.g. by Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto (2011) and in Poland by Grodzicki, Hałaj and 
Żochowski (2010). In fact, the exploration of this field is still nascent and Polish crunch-
related experience exhibits rather weak, if any, influence of the risk-taking channel. 
 
Hypothesis 8. Measures taken by the financial supervision 
 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority has undertaken some measures with regard to 
excess indebtedness – however, they all concerned household credits and were introduced 
already after the biggest damage had occurred. Recommendations brand-named “S” and “T” 
have meant to be a response to a global crisis, adjusted to the patterns of behavior of the 
Polish banking industry. The regulations are evaluated ambiguously. Recommendation “T” 
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endorses how to calculate the he maximum available credit for an individual and which stress 
tests to apply. Recommendation “S” provides best practices on housing loans and mortgages. 
Corporate lending was apparently not an issue worth exploring by the KNF. 
 
1.4.4. Other external factors 
 
Hypothesis 9. Foreign-based parent banks asked to cease lending 
 
Among claims emphasizing the decisive role of risk aversion in contraction, Jarosław 
Myjak, Deputy Chairman of blue chip PKO BP, responsible for corporate banking, admitted 
that fundamental issues were overall to a certain extent meaningful. In a press interview 
(Wilkowicz, 2009) he disclosed that some banks had been striving to dispose of assets in 
order to augment their capital adequacy ratios – not only for their own, but also at the level of 
pertinent international group. This worked like a hand brake, and consequently impeded 
lending activity. As soon as in November 2008 other analysts also raised concerns about the 
capital structure of the Polish banking sector. Stefan Kawalec (2008) persuaded that Poland is 
threatened with a sudden slowdown of credit flow. He made it clear that the threat stems from 
the fact that two thirds of Polish banks’ assets belong to international banking groups with 
headquarters in countries situated at the heart of the crisis. These banks were expected to shut 
down their foreign operations as a response to the financial distress. Among the empirical 
studies I managed to get acquainted with, one confirms the risk that under the unfavorable 
conditions, non-domestic credit institutions freeze their lending operations. Chmielewski’s 
(2006) model demonstrates that banks with a larger share of foreign equity tend to lend less 
after a monetary contraction. The author attributes this effect to weaker lending relationships 
with the clients or a more conservative approach which comes out of an unfinished process of 
acquiring the local knowledge. The latter is no longer a plausible contemplation, as most of 
the foreign banks operating in Poland now have surely managed to boost their market 
expertise significantly, as opposed to the 1997-2004 sample, which was scrutinized by 
Chmielewski. 
But here the KNF decided to employ a repelling strategy, and warned foreign affiliates, 
that any attempt to transfer disproportionately high portion of profit abroad, will result in 
counteractions forged by the KNF. Apart from dividend, foreign mother banks had limited 
opportunities to grab the Polish banks’ earnings. The Commission threatened to sue the parent 
banks under a very strict, somewhat a catch-22 article saying about “malpractice detrimental 
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to the company”. However, such „malpractices” are not at all marvels in the financial 
markets. For instance, although HSBC made huge writedowns in their core markets during 
the crisis, it was able to absorb them and balance them with its booming emerging-markets 
activities (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2009). 
How could such a mechanism work? Polish bank may open a deposit in its parent 
company. Although this is not considered to be a transfer of funds, the deposit practically 
injects money into the parent bank. However, this kind of financial operation is easily 
detectable by financial supervision authorities. In order to prevent it efficiently, the KNF soon 
after the breakout of the crisis, demanded a day-to-day reporting from Polish banks, e.g. on 
this type of operations. There are obviously more sophisticated measures, with which it is 
possible to pass by the watchdog. According to specialists, supervisory bodies have very 
limited resources to detect such walk-around steps. Even if this is rarely the case in Poland, 
not the mercy of foreign investors is responsible for that, but the very fact that resources being 
at the disposal of Polish banks are minor as compared with the needs of the financial world, 
stuck deep in the upheaval (Grzyb, 2008). 
KNF’s data reveal clearly that Polish banking industry’s funds invested abroad dropped 
in 2008 by 13,8 billion PLN. In the meantime, substantial foreign inflow was observed 
(foreign credits and loans, and foreign deposits), amounting to 84,5 billion PLN. It means that 
the exposition of Polish banks for foreign risk decreased. Contrary to the fears espoused by 
some, these were foreign institutions which substantially increase their engagement in Poland 
(Iskra, 2009). As a matter of fact, we may not infer about the purpose of the money flows. 
Along with higher volumes of foreign assets, the amount of foreign liabilities has also been 
sharply rising. The intention might be to stimulate lending activity, but more probably the 
bulk of money from abroad was designed to take advantage of higher interest rates in Poland. 
Given the shortage and poor frequency of reporting, broken-down by fundraising 
strategy, an in-depth analysis would not be reliable. Decomposing the foreign inflow by type 
of bank that received it, reveals the following dynamics of liabilities to non-resident 
institutions rose: 
- from 5.18 to 9.19 percent, in banks applying deposit strategy 
- from 65.27 to 74.82 percent, in banks applying foreign funding strategy 
- from 17.28 to 27.21 percent, in banks applying mixed strategy 
In sheer numbers, liabilities to non-resident institutions in that period almost doubled, 
from PLN 68.81 bn to PLN 128.28 bn. But according to Bratkowski and Myjak (2009: 5-6), 
banks applying deposit strategy have a 60 percent share in total assets within Polish banking 
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industry. And regardless of the turmoil, deposits continually overwhelmed credit and, from 
the point of view of liquidity, no real risk existed. Only less than 10 percent of assets are 
owned by banks, which gather funding abroad from the parent companies. As a stylized fact, 
we may infer that those who pursued mixed strategy faced relatively toughest problems. Their 
primary source of liquidity was the domestic interbank market, which died out, while foreign 
players could not exhibit a forceful commitment to compensate for it. These banks played 
aggressively in terms of customer deposits acquisition, thus initiating a spike in cost of credit. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 10. Net foreign assets in the Polish banking industry. Negatives indicate that the 
outflows are overwhelmed by inflows, thus the foreign-based institutions provide 
liquidity to their affiliates in Poland. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
2.1. Literature review 
 
As the subject matter covered by this thesis is relatively recent and the market put under 
investigation is still quite remote from anywhere adjacent to the hearts of financial markets, 
there is certainly insufficient scientific coverage of latest developments. This is why a certain 
amount of literature are press articles and commercial reports. Their presence in the 
bibliography is also crucial for the sake of qualitative assessment of behavioral aspects that 
might have drawn the crediting down. The summaries below are intended to delineate the 
theoretical concepts that surround corporate lending, although not all of them directly affect 
Poland’s market players at the current stage of the domestic market landscape. 
The most recent econometric paper devoted to crediting in Poland is that of Wdowiński 
(2011), with the newest observations dated 2Q 2010. His findings generally indicate that 
corporate credit is considerably inert. Its volume reacts weakly in response to the analyzed 
regressors. The increase of banks’ margin on relevant type of loans by 1 percentage point 
decreases the volume of commercial credit by 1 percent within the consecutive four years (as 
compared to 4 percent for mortgages and consumer loans). Even the boosting NPL ratio, 
while deteriorating by 10 percent, induces only a 4 percent slump in corporate credit 
throughout the respective period (up to 10 percent for mortgages and 5 percent for consumer 
loans). Unsurprisingly, the increase of central bank’s reference rate by 1 percentage point also 
hinders corporate lending to a smallest degree: up to 2.5 percent fall (5 percent for mortgages 
and 4 percent for consumer loans). 
While Wdowiński investigates the determinants of credit, Brzoza-Brzezina and 
Makarski (2010) have undertaken the effort to assess the role played by the banking sector in 
transmitting the slowdown, i.e. to what extent the recent financial sector disturbances affected 
national accounts in Poland. The researchers pinpoint that the domestic standstill was 
intensified by the restrictive behavior of banks, which increased the cost of borrowing and 
tightened conditions of lending. Moreover, they note that, similarly to other small open 
economies, Polish credit institutions were ‘driven by external rather than internal factors’ 
(2010: 10). Seeing the balanced situation domestically, one must look at worldwide crisis of 
confidence to understand what reduced the volume of transactions and raised spreads. Being 
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truly convinced of the validity of their arguments, Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski (2010: 21) 
consider financial sector disturbances as exogenous in their econometric model. What they 
have found out is that the macroeconomic impact of the crunch is ‘substantial though not 
overwhelming’, as banking sector shocks could explain 1.5 percent of the decline in GDP, as 
compared with approximately 2 percent explained by the recession in the EU (2010: 38-39). 
Considerable amount of literature was researched while elaborating the lending channel 
theory impact. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) were the first ones who defined what is now 
known as the bank lending channel, pointing out that the monetary policy can influence not 
only the demand for bank loans, but the supply as well. The paper of Matousek and Sarantis 
(2007) is particularly valuable source of considerations referring to monetary transmission 
mechanism, as it focuses on the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that joined the 
European Union in May 2004. The empirical results, performed on a large panel of 
disaggregate data for individual banks, have shown that there is a significant bank lending 
channel in all CEE states, though the strength of it varies across countries. The authors’ initial 
assumptions indicated that most sensitive to monetary policy shocks are:  
- Small banks, which have limited access to wholesale funding 
- Less liquid banks, which cannot insulate their loan portfolios by reducing their liquid assets 
- Poorly capitalized banks, due to their limited ability to tap into uninsured (non-deposit) 
sources of funds. 
Looking at the model’s results more closely, with each bank’s explanatory characteristic for 
monetary transmission isolated from the others: 
- Bank size is significant but has a negative sign in Poland, which is inconsistent with the 
theory; within the complete model, bank size becomes significant in all countries, but 
negative sign for Poland remains 
- Liquidity has the anticipated positive effect in all countries except Poland 
- Capitalization shows the significant positive coefficient only for Poland; overall, the 
evidence suggests that capitalization is not as important in distinguishing banks’ reactions 
to changes in the stance of monetary policy. 
As it may be derived from the above, Poland seems to be considerably peculiar on its 
lending channel performance and it is actually difficult to decipher what are accelerators and 
inhibitors for the internalization of monetary policy by Polish banks.  
Bijapur (2010) in his paper entitled “Does monetary policy lose effectiveness during a 
credit crunch?”, comes up with a positive answer. He tests whether ‘the impact of cuts in 
policy rates on GDP growth has been more muted during episodes of shortages of credit in the 
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US economy’. Indeed, this impact becomes diminished under crunch, and the relationship 
between interest rates and outstanding credit also weakens. However, the weakness of 
transmission mechanism stems not only from a “credit crunch” effect, but also from a 
“recession” effect. In Poland, where recession was not much of a problem,  the transmission 
should be smoother, ceteris paribus. 
Ganev et al. (2002) claim that analyzing a credit channel of monetary transmission 
poses considerable problems with finding comparable data and making cross-country 
inferences. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), researching this issue in the U.S. market, point out 
two observations. First, banks with a global outreach are better positioned to accommodate 
liquidity shocks, since they are capable of rearranging their resources between their offices 
worldwide (the concept of “internal capital market”). Second, the mere difference in size of 
domestic-only and global banks is important, but not critical, which reinforces the advantages 
to globalization that insulate bank networks from domestic monetary policy shifts. The results 
obtained by Havrylchyk (2005) are generally reliable, but she finds the magnitude of bank 
lending channel smaller than in the similar studies performed for the EU, as virtually all 
regressors are insignificant. It means that ‘during monetary contraction (expansion) Polish 
banks decrease (increase) their lending by far less then (sic! – M.S.) their counterparts in the 
current EMU member states’. In their insightful paper, published shortly after the breakout of 
the global crisis, Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marqués (2007) remark on a spectacular increase 
in securitization activity in the euro area, following the introduction of common currency, 
which has weakened the bank lending channel. The banks’ role shifts from “originate and 
hold” to “originate, repackage and sell” – thus, banks making use of securitization are more 
sheltered from the effects of monetary policy, which sometimes appears to possess many 
characteristics of a blunt tool. However, this very interesting interdependency is irrelevant for 
Poland. In the most recent paper, Łyziak, Przystupa and Wróbel (2008) found only weak 
evidence on the credit channel in Poland, by which they only confirm precedent findings. 
After the monetary policy tightening banks appear to trim down short-term lending, while the 
longer term loans for investment display lower semi-elasticities with respect to the interest 
rate. The authors interpret the fact that banks protect investment loans more than the credit in 
the current account as a cherry-picking process and a flight to quality. A similar phenomenon 
was observed in Poland after 2008, but it took place as a result of the crunch itself, not in 
response to the monetary policy. Additional insight into it, embracing corporate credit, is 
provided by Chmielewski (2006). According to his study, banks’ reaction to excessive zeal in 
monetary policy is weak as regards long term lending to important corporate customers, even 
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if the loans issued beforehand to them are of poor quality. This reveals a certain significance 
of relationship management in the domain of corporate (but not SME) lending. 
Numerous papers on credit market imperfections are helpful with regard to determining 
the “victims” of credit crunch. For instance, Tornell and Westermann (2003) reveal that firms 
from nontradables sector based in middle income countries (including Poland) suffer much 
more severely from borrowing constraints during the crunch that those manufacturing 
tradables. Bank-dependency of those companies is a derivative of their small size and little 
access to world capital markets. Moreover, since banks are strongly exposed to the 
nontradables sector, a long-lasting credit crunch outlives a usually brief recession, which 
precedes it. This finding concerning nontradables is confirmed by Varela (2011) who 
described the sector in question as more vulnerable to shocks, more responsive to interest 
rates and, simultaneously, more decisive for GDP levels. 
Last but not least, an interesting paper on the recent crisis, in context of the emerging 
economies, was published by Kamil and Rai (2009). Although they examined Latin America 
and the Caribbean, their empirical results seem to plausibly correspond with the Polish story. 
In the authors’ opinion, the global crisis has there been cushioned by the peculiar nature of 
foreign banks’ presence in the region. Local affiliates performed expansionary domestic 
currency lending, rather than direct cross-border lending in foreign currencies. Moreover, 
local affiliates’ funding mostly originated from a mounting domestic deposit base, rather than 
from parent banks or offshore wholesale markets, which would be by definition more volatile 
during the crisis. These characteristics muted the diffusion of external shocks.  
A certain amount of literature on behavioral issues was also researched. However, the 
downside here is the insurmountable richness of approaches in the realm of behavioral finance 
and, unfortunately, difficulties arise when it comes to extract valuable insights in these 
particular aspects of banking that are addressed within the framework of this work. 
Unquestionably, the narrowness of the subject of corporate lending in an emerging state is the 
source of a problem. 
 
2.2. Data input sources 
 
This chapter is generally designed to investigate how the real economy indices 
translated to the bank policies on loans. Hypothetical determinants of declining corporate 
credit should be divided into several groups, with regard to their verifiability and 
measurability. Neither widespread panic nor the pattern of relationship between foreign 
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mother banks’ requests to tighten credit policy and the actual activities of Polish-based 
affiliates is the factor that can be put under strict and serious verification in a scientific paper. 
They are therefore doomed to be dropped, unless a more courageous author dares to draw 
some sophisticated dummies. Next, a decline in interbank transactions’ volumes due to 
distrust and poor macroeconomic climate are measurable at least partially. However, it is 
difficult to put oneself in a position of judge and decide to what extent these phenomena 
affected the level of credit, as the aggregate mechanisms are biased by excess liquidity, and 
comparable data for individual banks are hard to retrieve. On top of this, with a considerable 
dose of certainty, we may infer about the fall in demand for credit, the deterioration of assets 
and the impact of monetary policy or regulatory body’s activity. These factors can also be 
pretty well measured. The most straightforward portion of the analysis encompasses the 
investigation of the fall in deposits, credit portfolios (banks’ preferences with regard to certain 
types of loans), and the applying criteria or terms and conditions of credit. 
The quantitative analysis is most vitally supported by the data provided by the NBP and 
the KNF. A significant portion of statistics comes also from Poland’s Cenral Statistical Office 
(GUS). Quotations of sentiment indices are pulled out from relevant institutions that quote 
them. Some supplementary data was collected from the European Central Bank’s (ECB) 
Statistical Data Warehouse, the World Bank and the IMF for the sake of side analyses. As 
missing values are not tolerated within autoregressive models, some had to be interpolated. 
Unfortunately, not only the time series are short, but also the frequency of reporting and 
range of subjects covered by reporting leave a lot to be desired. The situation is changing for 
better, e.g. from the beginning of 2011 the KNF switched to monthly reporting scheme, which 
would allow for the extended review of this analysis within several years. However, probably 
the main flaw that calls for change, apart from the time span of time series (self-solvable as 
time goes on), is the way in which lending volumes in the economy are reported by the central 
bank. The analysis would be much more fruitful if it might explain the variability of newly 
issued loans, rather than just the fluctuations of the outstanding amounts. This would directly 
capture the behavior of lenders, whereas now it is possible just to indirectly approximate it, 
since the outstanding amounts are sensitive to the possibly unbalanced maturity of loans in the 
sample. The study would then achieve its full usefulness. Haplessly, no reporting is made on 
that with required data granulation and frequency. 
The examined dataset included also those enumerated in the table below, as well as 
their various transformations and derivations. All data concerns Poland. 
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Table 2.  The rudimentary set of variables 
 
 Name 
Description  
(unit, source) 
Time span and 
remarks 
1 C_LT_CRITER 
Corporate long-term credit: banks’ 
criteria (net percentage, NBP: 
SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
2 C_LT_DEMAND 
Corporate long-term credit: firms’ 
demand (net percentage, NBP: 
SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
3 C_LT_POLICY 
Corporate long-term credit: banks’ 
policy (net percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
4 C_ST_CRITER 
Corporate short-term credit: banks’ 
criteria (net percentage, NBP: 
SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
5 C_ST_DEMAND 
Corporate short-term credit: firms’ 
demand (net percentage, NBP: 
SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
6 C_ST_POLICY 
Corporate short-term credit: banks’ 
policy (net percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
7 COLLATERAL 
Terms and conditions of corporate 
credit: required collateral (net 
percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
8 DEBT_INSTR 
Debt securities in banks’ assets 
(PLN, NBP) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
9 DEPOSITS 
Long-term deposits of non-financial 
sector agents (PLN, NBP) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
10 DEPOSITS_CORPO 
Long-term deposits of corporates 
(PLN, NBP) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
11 FGN_INDEBT 
Foreign non-bank non-government 
indebtedness of Polish agents (PLN, 
NBP) 
1999Q01 : 2010Q04 
12 MARGIN 
Terms and conditions of corporate 
credit: banks’ profit margin (net 
percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
13 MAX_SUM 
Terms and conditions of corporate 
credit: maximum sum available (net 
percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
14 MHL 
Mortgage and housing loans (PLN, 
NBP) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
15 NET_FGN_ASSETS 
Net foreign assets within financial 
sector (PLN, NBP) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
16 NPL_CORPO 
Non-performing corporate loans’ 
share in total corporate loans on the 
books (percentage, NBP) 
1996M12 : 
2010M12, 
methodology 
changed in 2009 
17 NPL_NFS 
Non-performing loans’ share in total 
non-financial sector loans on the 
books (percentage, NBP) 
1996M12 : 
2010M12, 
methodology 
changed in 2009 
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 Name 
Description  
(unit, source) 
Time span and 
remarks 
18 POLONIA_RATE_M 
Average monthly unweighted 
POLONIA reference rate 
(percentage, own calculations based 
on NBP data set) 
2005-01-24 :  
2010-12-31 
19 POLONIA_TURNOVER 
Average monthly turnover of 
interbank POLONIA O/N 
transactions (m PLN, own 
calculations based on NBP data set) 
2005-01-24 :  
2010-12-31 
20 REPO_RATE 
National Bank of Poland’s reference 
rate (percentage, NBP) 
1996 : 2010 
21 RETAIL_SALES_YY 
Year-on-year growth in retail sales 
(percentage, GUS) 
1998M04 : 2010M12 
22 SALARY 
Average salary in enterprises that 
employ more than 9 employees 
(PLN, GUS) 
2004M08 : 
2010M12, strongly 
seasonal 
23 SI_CONS 
Consumer confidence index (pure 
number, Ipsos Demoskop) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
24 SI_CONSTR 
Construction sector confidence 
index (pure number, GUS) 
1997M01 : 
2010M12, strongly 
seasonal 
25 SI_ECON 
Confidence index in the economy or 
Economic Climate Index (pure 
number, Ipsos Demoskop) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
26 SI_IND 
Industry confidence index (pure 
number, GUS) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
27 SI_TRADE 
Trade confidence index (pure 
number, GUS) 
2000M03 : 2010M12 
28 SME_LT_CRITER 
SME long-term credit: banks’ 
criteria (net percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
29 SME_LT_DEMAND 
SME long-term credit: firms’ 
demand (net percentage, NBP: 
SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
30 SME_LT_POLICY 
SME long-term credit: banks’ policy 
(net percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
31 SME_ST_CRITER 
SME short-term credit: banks’ 
criteria (net percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
32 SME_ST_DEMAND 
SME short-term credit: firms’ 
demand (net percentage, NBP: 
SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
33 SME_ST_POLICY 
SME short-term credit: banks’ 
policy (net percentage, NBP: SLOS) 
2003Q04 : 2010Q04 
34 TOT_C_LOANS 
Outstanding amount of corporate 
loans (million PLN, NBP) 
1996M12 : 2010M12 
35 UNEMPL 
Registered unemployment 
(percentage, GUS) 
1996M12 : 
2010M12, traces of 
seasonality 
 
Source: NBP, KNF, GUS. 
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2.3. In search of rational interdependencies 
 
Out of the numerous hindrances that accompanied a long-lasting effort made until both 
theoretically and empirically plausible interactions between variables were acknowledged, the 
most important one is the unavoidable risk of reverse causality. It not only makes perfect 
quantitative orthogonalization unworkable, but also hampers theoretical reasoning. This 
phenomenon may practically refer to vast majority of links. For instance, the elementary link, 
perhaps quite old-fashioned nowadays, between (corporate) deposits and (corporate) lending, 
is vaguer than it seems. The decrease in deposits may inform that companies, unable to apply 
for additional liquidity, decide to diminish their liquid assets in order to raise investments or 
settle short term liabilities. In other words, companies are forced to defer their preferred 
source of liquidity and find alternative one, which are deposits. But the other way round, a 
drop in deposits – reducing banks’ deposit base and thus liquidity – might itself cause a 
contraction in lending amounts, and then the mechanism of a recurring vicious circle emerges. 
Such riddles are prevalent. 
 
Portfolio adjustments 
 
In theory, portfolio adjustment theory seems considerably robust. A shift to retail 
credits is confirmed e.g. by Jakub Borowski from Invest Bank and Maja Goettig from Bank 
BPH (Kuk, 2009). In both static and dynamic analyses, however, mortgage and housing loans 
are completely irrelevant descriptor of corporate lending instabilities. This is because both 
types of loans are inseparably connected with economic growth, thus they both have been 
growing almost monotonically throughout the recent decade. The shift that took place in 
2009, a slight in numbers, although psychologically and graphically compelling, is “lost” in 
time series’ breadth, even in the short term model. The possible extension task is to assess 
whether the mortgage loans develop quicker just because their ‘backwardness’ is of higher 
magnitude, and the catch-up needs are greater than for corporate lending. This is suggested by 
Kokot et al. (2004), who holds the domestic corporate banking in high esteem. To this 
purpose, equilibrium amounts of mortgage and corporate loans have to be computed for the 
developed economies. 
Not being able to infer from actual lending levels, we may still make an attempt to bear 
out that banks at least came upon increased incentives to rethink their strategies. To this end a 
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synthetic measure of risk, named credit risk indicator (CRI), will be helpful. It was proposed 
by Bank BPH (2010) in one of its reports. It is constructed as follows: 
 
issuedloansofvaluetotal
issuedloansoftypecertainofvalue
NPLsofvaluetotal
loansoftypecertainamongNPLsofvalue
CRI   
 
It is assumed that CRI below 0.8 indicates that a given segment is relatively low risk, 
while the range 0.8-1.2 indicates moderate risk, and above average risk loans exhibit CRI 
greater than 1.2. 
 
Table 3.  Credit risk indicator for particular types of credit 
 
Period Total 
corporate 
Large 
enterprises 
SMEs Housing loans Cash 
loans 
Gov’t 
loans 
PLN FCY PLN FCY PLN FCY PLN CHF FCY 
03-2009 1,7 1,0 1,2 1,0 2,0 1,0 0,4 0,1 0,5 1,6 0,1 
04-2009 1,7 1,0 1,3 1,0 1,9 1,0 0,4 0,1 0,5 1,6 0,1 
05-2009 1,7 1,0 1,3 1,0 2,0 1,1 0,4 0,1 0,4 1,6 0,0 
06-2009 1,8 0,9 1,4 0,8 2,1 1,1 0,3 0,1 0,4 1,6 0,1 
07-2009 1,7 0,9 1,3 0,9 2,0 1,0 0,3 0,1 0,4 1,7 0,1 
08-2009 1,7 0,9 1,4 0,8 1,9 1,1 0,3 0,1 0,3 1,7 0,1 
09-2009 1,7 0,8 1,3 0,8 2,0 0,9 0,3 0,1 0,3 1,8 0,0 
10-2009 1,7 0,8 1,3 0,8 2,0 0,9 0,3 0,2 0,3 1,8 0,0 
11-2009 1,7 0,8 1,3 0,8 2,0 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,2 1,9 0,0 
12-2009 1,9 0,8 1,5 0,8 2,2 0,7 0,3 0,1 0,2 1,8 0,0 
01-2010 1,8 0,8 1,5 0,8 2,0 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,2 2,0 0,0 
02-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,9 2,0 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 0,0 
03-2010 1,8 0,8 1,5 0,9 1,9 0,7 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 0,0 
04-2010 1,7 0,8 1,4 0,9 1,9 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 0,0 
05-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,8 2,1 0,7 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 0,0 
06-2010 1,8 0,8 1,5 0,9 2,1 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 0,0 
07-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,9 2,1 0,8 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,0 0,0 
08-2010 1,8 0,8 1,3 0,9 2,1 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,1 2,1 0,0 
09-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,9 2,0 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,1 2,1 0,0 
10-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,8 2,1 0,8 0,3 0,2 0,1 2,1 0,0 
11-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,8 2,1 0,9 0,4 0,2 0,1 2,2 0,0 
12-2010 1,8 0,8 1,4 0,8 2,1 0,8 0,4 0,2 0,1 2,2 0,0 
01-2011 1,8 0,8 1,3 0,8 2,1 0,8 0,4 0,2 0,1 2,3 0,0 
02-2011 1,8 0,8 1,3 0,7 2,0 0,8 0,4 0,2 0,1 2,3 0,0 
03-2011 1,7 0,8 1,3 0,7 2,0 0,8 0,4 0,2 0,1 2,3 0,0 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of NBP’s data set. 
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It is undoubtedly self-explanatory that certain types of corporate loans were among the 
riskiest ones. It is only during 2010 when cash loans slightly overwhelmed SME PLN credit 
in terms of default risk. On the contrary, as it has already been indicated, elevated profitability 
of consumer loans pays off the increased risk, while SME loans are both risky and only 
moderately profitable. From banks’ perspective, foreign currency lending is considerably 
safer. However, these are by far not as prevalent among corporates, as among individual 
mortgage-takers (due to scare significance of the foreign currency corporate lending, the 
inference in this paper is not controlled for the fluctuations in the exchange rates). 
Unfortunately, the poor granularity of the raw data set does not allow for running a similar 
analysis for pre-crisis periods, which would surely be very informative. 
 
Deterioration of assets 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 11. Non-performing loans have been on the rise since 2009, but they did not reach the 
peak level of 2001-2004. Nevertheless, it seems that this relatively minor surge 
spurred the decrease in outstanding corporate loans. 
 
Andrzej Bratkowski claims that there must be a differentiation between a surge in risk 
and a surge in risk aversion. As the economic conditions worsen,  the financial standings of 
virtually all actors in the economy automatically worsen accordingly. It means that all firms 
rise up to higher risk categories. Therefore, even if banks’ criteria are unchanged, we will 
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encounter a decline in lending, ceteris paribus. Bratkowski theorizes that the deteriorating 
NPL ratio indicates that banks are still not risk averse enough (sic!). Otherwise, with constant 
risk aversion, they would have avoided the losses, provided that it is possible for banks to 
obtain perfect insight into enterprises’ financial standings. (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 12) 
The question remains of how reasonable it is to cut lending automatically when NPLs 
grow. Possible alternatives include restructuring of prospective loan assessment, which is 
rather sophisticated option, or niche seeking, i.e. concentrating on serving the least affected 
industries or the ones, in which comparative advantage may be built. The conception of 
sacrificing short-term gains in order to maintain decent relationships with clients in the longer 
horizon, is also meaningful. However, the facts and figures related to NPLs are usually very 
robust and do not leave much room for alternative interpretations. In fact, the share of NPLs is 
one of the most important regressors in the equation for lending levels, at least in the short run. 
 
Stagnant deposit base 
 
Liquidity hardships in the interbank market drew corporate banking into increased 
dependency on both retail and corporate deposits (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 24). 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 12. Deposit base versus corporate 
lending level. 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 13. Changes in corporate deposits 
versus changes in outstanding 
corporate loans. 
 
What we can observe is that the momentum of lending could be out of breath at the 
moment, as in 2007 and 2008 their amount has been soaring by far faster than the amount of 
deposits. However, deposits were just in time to respond to the skyrocketing interest rates and 
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provided additional liquidity to the banks at the end of 2008. From then on, deposits remained 
at more or less the same level, but credit crunch started to take its toll. 
The figure 13 instructs that corporate deposits are much more volatile than corporate 
loans. This hampers strategic planning in the long term. This is why corporate deposits may 
not be the primary source of liquidity for banks, and are merely auxiliary with regard to retail 
deposits and the interbank market. 
 
Monetary lending channel 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 14. Ambiguous interdependence between outstanding corporate loans and NBP 
reference rate. In 2008, lending rose amid spiking reference rate, while in 2009 
and 2010 it stagnated in spite of the declining rate. 
 
The basic question that needs to be answered is whether the central bank indeed forged 
contractionary monetary policy during the turmoil. It would be signaled either by reducing the 
monetary base or increasing reserve requirements, or reducing discount window lending, or, 
finally, increasing the nominal interest rates. 
Repo rate was regularly lowered until March 2006, when it reached 4 percent and 
remained at this level until April 2007, when no signs of the crisis were visible yet. Repo rate 
anchored at 6 percent in July 2008. If we assume that banks ‘should’ react, they did so in 
April 2009, when during just one month, amount of outstanding loans decreased by nearly 5 
billion PLN. However, this is about a year after the macroprudential impulse was produced. 
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There is no compromise on how long the signal transmission in monetary policy takes. 
However, after rebounding, reference rate dived to 3.5 percent just in July 2009 and 
demonstrate incredible stability for over one year. Confronted with the facts, it seemingly did 
not contribute to the rebuilt of corporate credit. The question arises if monetary policy is less 
futile when contractionary than expansionary, but with just two expansionary and one 
contractionary period in this sample, it is not judicious to draw definite theses as regards this 
problem. 
To fully assess monetary policy, it is indispensable to take into account other rates 
quoted by the NBP. However, reserve requirement for banks was at a steady level of 3.5 
percent until June 2009, when it was relaxed by 0.5 percent – though not bringing any 
breakthrough. Other rates, including most important lombard rate, have always been being 
changed symmetrically to the repo rate. 
To make the perspective thorough, attention should be directed to the interbank market. 
It is interbank market where banks invest excess money or borrow short term funds to stay 
liquid. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 15. Outstanding corporate loans as compared with turnover of transactions concluded 
in the interbank market. 
 
POLONIA turnover has not yet re-reach its record highs from August 2007 (over 6 bn 
PLN), which overlapped the first days of global crisis. The growing trend seems to be 
reinforced in the first months of 2010. 
The correlation matrix brings very plausible results. On the one hand, POLONIA 
turnover is moderately useful in explaining short term effects of loans issuance (0.34), but is 
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not very helpful while considering the total amount (-0.11). On the other hand, increasing 
reference rate conceivably downsizes the total amount (-0.27), but is highly irrelevant in short 
term (0.47). Therefore, conditional to the type of dependent variable, either POLONIA 
turnover or NBP’s repo rate exhibit potential to be vital explanatory variables. 
However, the monetary policy itself displays only moderate explanatory power, which 
is in line with e.g. Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011: 22), who claim that the impact of financial 
crises on growth performance is modestly influenced by monetary policy, whereas fiscal 
policies are much more effective. Moreover, Grodzicki, Hałaj and Żochowski (2010: 18) 
empirically prove that domestic interest rates are insignificant in explaining loan growth. 
Simultaneously high foreign interest rates are associated with higher corporate loan growth. 
This is typical for financial industries, in which there is the majority of foreign-owned banks. 
 
2.4. High-level inferences 
 
We operate in a communicating vessels framework. The intuitive orthogonalization of 
dynamic correlations between variables is relatively easy to perform, unlike the assessment of 
the strength of these interactions, which directly transforms to their significance or non-
significance. With regard to the theory-supported data provided in this chapter, the following 
is implicit:  
- A flight to quality occurred: banks have been striving to diminish the share of the most 
risky assets in their portfolio, giving underperforming enterprises short shrift 
- Customers’ deposits that stopped growing, were a cause of concern for banks struggling to 
meet their capital adequacy ratio, unofficially raised from required 8 percent to 10 percent 
recommended by the KNF (Samcik, 2009) – this implied relatively conservative measures 
in the area of prospective loans assessment 
- Uncertainty among market players led to the demise of the interbank market, where banks 
used to reinforce their short-term liquidity – nevertheless, excess liquidity was still 
ubiquitous. 
Crunching the available data was even more fruitful in identifying the inferences that 
are seemingly incorrect, although they used to be more or less frequently put forward by 
experts. The robustness of these conclusions has been seriously shaken. The reasons are: 
- Foreign-based parent banks, in aggregate, did not make an effort to transfer their affiliates’ 
profits abroad, thus the financial standing of domestic institutions, as a whole, has been 
neither deliberately nor heavily weakened; however, individual exceptions may apply 
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- Banks have not faced direct liquidity problems, since NBP’s open market transactions 
volume suggests that banks were vested with ample resources and it is a shift in policy or 
market conditions that diverted their attention from lending activities, not the unmet 
financing needs 
- Central bank’s policy was highly unlikely to have any negative effect on lending volumes; 
although the NBP significantly reduced its reference rate, it did not preclude the decreased 
corporate lending from arising – it may possibly be another evidence of impaired monetary 
transmission, not being the strong suit of Poland’s financial sector; however, a more 
detailed analysis is needed to figure out whether NBP’s activities nevertheless cushioned 
the slowdown – what we know for sure now is just that they did not contribute to 
exacerbating it. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSION 
 
 
3.1. Desk research 
 
The goal of this paper is to detect whether and to what extent the behavioral factors 
contribute to the determination of lending amounts. Before moving forward with the model, 
the crucial “animal spirits”, as Keynes would have said, have to be investigated. Most of them 
are to some extent unobservables, but the profound impact of animal instincts with regard to 
the Polish crunch incident is explicitly corroborated e.g. by Brzoza-Brzezina and Makarski 
(2010: 8). Therefore, although the authors themselves point out measurement complexity, the 
adopted diagnosis obliges to at least attempt to find relevant proxies. The importance of this 
brief analysis is clear. The atmosphere of a crisis increases the probability that the decision 
making process is performed under extraordinary pressure, which makes economic agents 
more than usual risk averse. The key stressors are: 
- Frantic pace of events and the chaotic flow of information, resulting in the data smog 
- Uncertainty with regard to the depth, breadth and durability of the crisis, as well as the 
parties hit; all forecasts are potentially biased 
- Uncertainty with regard to the magnitude of austerity measures that actually need to be 
taken within an organization to secure its financial standing and reputation – as no 
guarantee exists that a lifeline will be thrown by a third party in case of emergency 
Jocelyn Pixley (2004: 146) utters that ‘banks allocate credit according to trust or 
distrust’, thus inevitably administrative discretion applies. She also rightly says that trust is an 
emotion best acknowledged when it turns into the opposite, and in moments of crisis little 
suffices for trust unexpectedly transmuting into blame or rage. This opinion is echoed by 
Milne (2009), who claims that ‘financial markets are inherently unstable, veering from 
excessive optimism to excessive pessimism’ and that banks have always leaned towards 
increasing their lending too much in booms and to reducing it too heavily in recessions. 
Obviously, the sinister legacy of panic is accentuated globally. Hence, it is not only a 
non-fundamental, but also an external candidate for our portfolio of factors. Milne (2009) 
gives voice to the problem of panic and urges that since the mistakes of the past are 
irreversible, we should now concentrate on factors that are protracting the duration of the 
contraction of credit. He enumerates panic responses to the destabilization, the lack of trust in 
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banks and the fear of how deep the current downturn can yet become. In addition to this, he is 
far from neglecting psychological and cultural factors behind the situation and emphasizes the 
cyclical interchangeability between excessive pessimism in bust times and blithe optimism in 
boom times. Keeping track on this thread, it is useful to refer to Kindleberger (in Pixley, 
2004: 169) again, as he describes a set of relations of trust and distrust in a global network of 
corporate entities as ‘fragile and dynamic’. As Pixley herself continues, ‘there is no avoidance 
of emotions in the everyday, complicated world of corporate entities engaged in competitive 
struggles for dominance’. 
In the area of more fundamentally financial papers, in their aged, but not an outdated 
article, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that even in a competitive equilibrium a loan market 
may be characterized by credit rationing. It may be stirred by the existence of several types of 
informational asymmetries: adverse selection, moral hazard, monitoring. 
When it comes to Poland-specific research, Wilkowicz (2009) quotes Bratkowski who 
confirms that risk aversion is to blame for corporate credit contraction in the first half of 2009. 
Banks’ deteriorating liquidity and capital constraints were allegedly of only minor sway. The 
economist has also remarked that senior loan officers highlighted in quarterly SLOS 
questionnaires (discussed in detail below) that poor macroeconomic situation is the key 
inhibitor to credit expansion. However, a possible bias is associated with this statement. For 
marketing purposes, banks are uneasy to communicate capital or liquidity problems. Instead, 
they explain to the public that it is the crisis, whatever it means, that restrains credit supply. 
Moreover, it is also a shrewd justification for increases in margins or required collaterals. 
Some scholars also infer that reduced crediting in the banking sector might result from 
low competition, determining weak motivation to fight for clientele. On the one hand, this 
appears to be a compelling explanation, on the other hand the method of validating this 
hypothesis would have to be too discretional. The level of competition in the banking sector is 
not merely the derivative of the level of concentration, as the banking industry is “suspected” 
to be a contestable market, in Baumol’s sense (see Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C. and Willig, R. 
D., 1982, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure), as found out by 
Pawłowska (2010). Moreover, Panzar and Rosse test applied by her deduces that the Polish 
financial industry is characterized by rather decent competition level. 
Eventually, behavioral aspect of the credit crunch will thus be measured here through: 
- Macroeconomic indices, including retail sales, unemployment and salary 
- Sentiment or confidence indices 
- NBP’s Senior Loan Officer Surveys (SLOS) and surveys performed regularly among firms 
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3.1.1. Macroeconomic climate  
 
Most of the scholars and bankers accentuate the importance of mutual trust between the 
market players. Although the financial world is more often than not considered to be a 
ruthless kingdom of rationality, this pop-culture-rooted image emerges as ultimately invalid in 
the light of latest developments. Murphy (2009, 284-285), for instance, offers a spiral theory 
of how the crunch has actually been built up, in which the issue of confidence is of prominent 
importance. Not surprisingly, the first step is a lack of confidence between financial 
institutions themselves, which reduces their “largesse” and willingness to lend to each other. 
This, subsequently, disseminates to other investors, too. Furthermore, the demand for good 
quality collateral significantly skyrockets. However, a hiking cost of funding decreases banks’ 
profitability and constitutes another premise for reduced ability to lend. However, the 
widespread demise of securitization facilitates the return of assets back on the firms’ balance 
sheets, which reinforces their appetite for additional liquidity. Nevertheless, here is where 
confidence comes into play again. As the stress in the funding market persists, banks strive to 
communicate decent results to the market, proving sound financial status. In order to do that, 
they reduce their funding liquidity risks, i.e. protect themselves from the customers’ panic. At 
the top of everything, central bank’s intervention may turn out to be inadequate to reliquify 
the financial system if the confidence loss is too severe. 
Intensifiers of the global crisis were complexity and leverage, as noted by Gorton 
(2008) and Murphy (2009). None of these is particularly helpful when researching the Polish 
case. What then multiplied a relatively weak external signal and elicited the crunch in Poland? 
Qualitative evidence illustrates that sometimes only little suffices. Investors in Poland are 
notoriously quite over-sensitive to external information. A good example is the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange, where investors are frequently reported to overreact in response to the news 
releases concerning the U.S. unemployment-related figures or those on Chinese export. This 
quite megalomaniac feedback, stemming from apparent overestimation of the law of 
communicating vessels’ magnitude is inherent, but not fully justified in a still pretty remote 
marketplace. 
Another intensifier had to do with fundamentals, though not being fundamental itself. It 
is uncertainty of banks with regard to how balance sheets perform in peer banks, the issue 
already raised earlier in this paper. The equivalent doubt might, however, hold for the 
enterprises as well, hence quite spectacular write-downs were made after businesses went 
astray after dissipating lavish amounts of money when investing in options. Not being sure 
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about the scrutiny with which one’s business partner runs his firm, one may have reasonable 
worries surrounding the decision whether to grant a trade credit or not. Thus, uncertainty 
prevailed within three channels: banks to banks, banks to enterprises, and enterprises to 
enterprises, with this last relationship being out of scope of the pertinent study. 
Let’s now explore the demand side of the problem to search for further intensifiers.  
Granted, the exporting firms, or each one plugged to a smaller or greater extent to the 
international trade, encountered uncertainty. Pre-emptive procrastination as regards big 
investment projects, plus slightly excessive thrift concerning firms’ day-to-day operations, 
would be understandable, as in line with the “better safe than sorry” approach. Nevertheless, 
what about the colossal portion of enterprises that have no linkages to abroad and operate on a 
“safe and sound” market located in the “green island” surrounded by the ocean of crisis. May 
such an appraisal, frequently re-echoed by not only the local media, discourage anyone from 
borrowing additional funds in order to continue on thriving expansion? Such an inference 
may not be ruled out. According to the conventional risk aversion concept, a potential loss 
looms larger, i.e. it is perceived more harmful, than an equally likely gain of the same 
magnitude is perceived to give pleasure (Brooks and Zank, 2004: 2-3). All in all, it is 
seemingly better, or at least more compliant with textbook economics, to overestimate the risk 
than to underestimate it. However, it seems that the fall of demand was only secondary to the 
less favorable lending conditions, which were rather the primary indicator of the crunch.  
The figure 16 authorizes the inference that the decline in demand in 2009 was less 
pronounced that the increase in banks’ aversion to lend. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011a). 
 
Figure 16. Fewer enterprises were interested in obtaining a loan in 2009 and 2010, but the 
slightly decreasing trend is rather long-term. When it comes to acceptance of credit 
applications, bigger decline is visible. Yet in 3Q 2008 banks accepted nearly 90 
percent of applications, and they came down to less than 70 percent in 1Q 2009.  
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Overall, despite the slowdown, Polish firms stayed in relatively good shape. For sure, 
given the limited scope of corporate lending in the Polish economy, the problem of excess 
borrowing was scarce. The only problem arose in 2009 and was related to excess investment 
in derivatives. (Bratkowski and Myjak, 2009: 23). But neither firms’ internal problems, nor 
banks’ repelling policies seem likely to decrease enterprises’ appetite for loans, particularly 
for the short-term ones. 
The figure 17 below shows that firms’ liquidity standing has been deteriorating 
throughout 2007 and 2008. Back then, it did not ignite banks’ risk aversion. Analogously, the 
figure 18 demonstrates that the share of enterprises having trouble with debt repayment 
quaked in 2008, but in fact, it seriously nosedived a year later. Still, with more than 87 
percent of firms repaying bank credits in time, the overall condition of Polish enterprises is 
pretty optimistic. 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011a). 
 
Figure 17. Liquidity standing of Polish 
enterprises started to deteriorate 
yet in 2007, while in 2009 and 
2010 it was rather stable.  
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011a) 
 
Figure 18. Share of enterprises reporting 
no problems with bank debt 
repayments declined sharply in 
2009 but embarked on a 
rebound in 2H 2010. 
 
Banks always take a look on macroeconomic data, being an indicator of 
macroeconomic environment condition. The most important ones are data on unemployment, 
salary and year-on-year retail sales. The variable representing salary concerns the average 
wage in enterprises employing more than 9 people (micro firms are excluded). 
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Source: GUS, National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 19. The interplay between total 
corporate loans and year-on-
year changes in both retail sales 
and unemployment. Retail sales 
figures are not compelling, but 
they are valid in juxtaposition 
with marginal credit fluctuations. 
Source: GUS, National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 20. Year-on-year changes in average 
salary and outstanding corporate 
loans reveal convincing 
cointegration-like relationship, 
but the time series is relatively 
short. 
 
Both the salary and the percentage of unemployed are to a large extent seasonal, with 
high peaks (in case of unemployment) or drops (in case of salary) at the beginning of each 
year. This is why it is better to use total values rather than monthly fluctuations as a base to 
correlation check. The instantaneous correlation coefficient between outstanding corporate 
loans and unemployment rate is -0.229, but it improves to -0.265 with unemployment’s sixth 
lag and to -0.289 with the twelfth lag. Although the sign of the interdependence is doubtless, 
the strength could have been better. 
What was expected was no impact of regressors on monthly fluctuations of corporate 
lending. Correlation coefficients are all below 0.33. Instead, there is very strong and plausible 
interaction between salary and unemployment, and corporate lending levels. Year-on-year 
changes in retail sales, on the contrary, displayed negative correlation, which may be 
perceived as mind-boggling and extremely contrary to the anticipations, but the lagged values 
are more informative in this case. 
 
3.1.2. Sentiment indices 
 
Sentiment indices are imperfect reflection of reality. They are based on surveys to a 
limited, though considered representative portion of the population. They seem to be fairly 
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well intertwined with the output value of corporate credit. It may be seen clearly on the figure 
21, that sentiment indices have given an advance indication of decreased prosperity by falling 
sharply at the end of 2008. However, sentiment index in trade and in industry have been 
falling not comparably deep as the other indicators. 
Source: GUS, Ipsos Demoskop, National Bank of Poland. 
 
Figure 21. Sentiment indices are quite collinear and nuances will decide which variables out 
of these will be utilized in final model estimation. 
 
Instantaneous correlation matrix proves the visual interpretation. The positive interplay 
between sentiment indices levels and quarter-on-quarter change in outstanding corporate 
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loans is robust. However, there is no positive correlation with total, non-differenced levels, 
apart from sentiment index in trade, but even then, the correlation coefficient is low (0.253). 
With three lags applied to the values of indices, the coefficient of trade confidence index rises 
(0.439), but the other ones remain negative. It seems that fluctuations in prosperity contribute 
to the marginal change of dependent variable, but in the long run they are a useless regressor. 
Nevertheless, the time series is perhaps too short to come out with such implications. 
 
3.1.3. SLOS questionnaires 
 
Polish methodology of Senior Loan Officer Survey (SLOS) interprets each positive 
number, defined as the net percentage, as a favorable change from customer’s perspective. 
For instance, if the banks’ interest margin yields positive figure, it means that banks have in 
fact relaxed their policies on margin. A net percentage is thus a difference between optimists 
and pessimists numbers related to the total number of respondents answering particular 
question in the survey. This is obviously only a synthetic proxy, with no direct interpretation. 
This short visual analysis indicates that most probably lending criteria would equally 
well be a dependent variable instead of the credit volume. However, one may have concerns 
about the amplitudes – banks were desperately tightening their policies to the verge of reason. 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011b). 
 
Figure 22. Corporate loans criteria broken 
down by type of credit.  
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011b). 
 
Figure 23. Demand for corporate loans 
broken down by type of credit.
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 Intuitively, one might say that by tightening lending criteria and restraining terms and 
conditions of credit, banks release an unequivocal signal that all they want is to lend less. 
Theoretically, this interdependency does not have to hold, since the creditworthiness of 
borrowers may improve in line with the increasingly strict credit parameters. Actually, what is 
really informative in this field of discussion, is the aggregate plot covering broader period. 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011b). 
 
Figure 24. Quarter-on-quarter change in outstanding corporate loans compared with synthetic 
measure of accumulated (starting 4Q 2003) aggregate firms’ demand for credit. 
The demand stopped growing in 2008, which translated to the decreased lending a 
year later. 
 
It is evident that as soon as the demand stopped growing, the amount of outstanding 
credit fell. Although such a dramatic causality perhaps did not happen, the above graphic is 
still much of a help. 
The recent paper of Grodzkicki, Hałaj and Żochowski (2010) adopts a panel model to 
test if Polish individual banks’ lending policies have an impact on banks’ loan supply. 
Instinctively, a positive relationship is evident here, since by declaring stricter policy a bank 
signals its greater than before reluctance to lend. Nevertheless, the paper is still valuable for 
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the sake of this research, as it features commercial loans and offers considerably in-depth 
theoretical background. Employing data from the Polish bank lending survey (SLOS), the 
authors controlled also for demand-side factors. Predictably, they concluded that individual 
bank lending strategies are an important driver of credit growth. Interestingly, fundamental 
constraints (e.g. capital or liquidity) were much less significant in determining this dynamism. 
While proceeding further into the analysis, the authors discovered that banks which 
operate in the corporate loan market adjust loan supply much more forcefully by changing the 
loan approval criteria than by changing the terms on loans such as price, maturity or loan 
collateral. According to the researchers, it is because of two mechanisms. First, large 
corporates are seasoned borrowers having a good grasp of the market and due to fierce 
competition it is easy to discourage them. On the opposite, credit standards are rather opaque 
to the firms and it is less risky to manipulate them. Second, banks’ treatment of corporate 
customers may be excessively rigorous due to ‘past episodes of corporate financial distress in 
mid-1990s and early 2000s’. Again, credit rationing channeled by credit standards is more 
convenient, as it empowers banks to review the applications that theoretically meet loan terms 
and conditions, but eventually reject the ones that do not fulfill augmented minimum 
acceptance criteria. (Grodzicki, Hałaj and Żochowski, 2010: 17-18) 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011b). 
 
Figure 25. Banks’ policy towards certain 
types of corporate lending.  
 
 
Source: National Bank of Poland (2011b). 
 
Figure 26. Terms and conditions of 
corporate credit, applied by 
banks.
The figure 25 above puts on view the just discussed shifts in banks’ policies towards 
crediting. Surprisingly, until mid-2008 they were more likely to favor inherently riskier SMEs 
rather than corporations. Afterwards, all the approaches have more or less leveled off, with 
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short-term credit for corporations slightly more privileged throughout 2009 and first half of 
2010. 
The figure 26 is also interesting. It stems from the theory that the stricter rules in terms 
of required collateral were particularly calamitous to the lending levels. The thing is, as the 
value of firms’ assets has supposedly been shrinking, lenders should adjust the requirements 
by setting them at the lower level. In fact, banks’ measures were opposite and might have 
magnified the crunch. Obviously, it was banks’ response to the information asymmetry, an 
imbalance that marks its presence particularly during the periods of distress. The problem of 
informational opacity between firms and banks is often raised in literature (e.g. Berger, 
Molyneux and Wilson, 2010; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), 
since it typically gives rise to above-average credit rationing. However, while constituting an 
at least partial solution to information asymmetry issue, the enforcement of higher 
collateralization may not necessarily combat the adverse selection problem. Both the value 
and even the quality of assets held, alone, do not provide sufficient information on a given 
firm’s operating activity and its prospects. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981: 402-405) indicate, under 
reasonable assumptions, that the higher collateral requirements imply that firms can only 
finance smaller projects with higher risk. Therefore higher collateral fuels adverse selection. 
The presumption of adverse selection in Poland is expressed by Bratkowski in Bratkowski 
and Myjak (2009: 12): while well-performing companies tend to wait until they apply for a 
new credit, the weaker ones struggle to gain liquidity, since it may be the only tactics aimed at 
avoiding bankruptcy. 
Moreover, with regard to other constituents of terms and conditions of corporate credit, 
Hempell and Sørensen (2010: 15-16) found that increases in margins on both average and 
riskier loans tend to bring about a decline in loan growth in following quarters. Comparably, 
introducing restrictions on the size of loans offered has also a significant and even stronger 
negative impact on loan growth. Although their study covers only the euro zone states, it 
seems that the applicable results are too intuitive to be rejected in Poland’s case. 
Obviously, terms of credit do not influence directly the amount of outstanding loans. 
They may only affect decisions. Based on the aforementioned arguments, it seems that the 
regulations concerning collateral are of most crucial magnitude among the three proposed. 
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3.2. Behavioral impact summary 
 
Gorton (2008: 62) in his own, quite U.S.-centric, analysis of the crisis-related panic, 
underlines that its roots lie in the fear of losses, the extent of which cannot be determined, due 
to opacity of modern financial instruments. Accordingly, he points out also a ‘virulent knock-
on effect’: evaporated liquidity. ‘With no liquidity and no market prices, the accounting 
practice of marking-to-market became highly problematic and resulted in massive write-
downs based on fire sale prices and estimates’. Massive collateral calls exacerbated liquidity 
problems even more. On top of that, a refusal to lend embodied an “official” credit crunch. 
Although not all pieces of this puzzle match the domestic credit crunch logic, the 
underlying analysis justifies the conclusion that non-fundamental premises had a profound 
influence on lending volumes. Manipulating credit terms and conditions and excessive flight 
to liquidity, amplified by sometimes maniacal fixation on what global players do, are 
altogether the best description of the Polish economic landscape during the turbulence. 
Unfortunately, there are shortcomings and controversies that seriously undermine leveraging 
the behavioral data in the model. First, the quantity of those time series is limited: there are 
fewer non-fundamental time series than fundamental ones. Second, most important, vast 
majority of them is characterized by collinearity problem. Including more than one sentiment 
index, or more than one SLOS-based variable, increases the risk of unauthentic regression. 
Third, the non-fundamentality of some variables remains highly debatable. It is relatively 
simple task to defend the claim that banks’ policies, criteria or terms and conditions of credit 
are, logically, identical to the aggregate lending level. If we assume that banks pre-define their 
target credit issuance, the above mentioned serve just as tools to achieve the goal. Whenever 
effective, these tools should perform in a way that ensures the desired outcome. If so, the 
model would yield an identity correlation and would not be based on accurate economic 
reasoning. The crucial question which is implied by that is whether we should treat banks’ 
lending policies as primary input. Certainly not, as they more often than not derive from 
exogenous impulses and are not independent. Fourth, the fact that the crucial source of 
information concerning enterprises’ demand for credit comes from within the banking 
industry, is a source of a potential bias. Banks might either deliberately underreport the 
demand, willing to be cleared of responsibility for sluggish lending, or simply unwittingly 
misjudge it. No doubt that the query on customers’ demand belongs to the most problematic 
questions in the SLOS questionnaire, and it would be useful to develop an alternative 
indicator for this variable, rooted in the real economy, not the banking sector. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION 
 
 
4.1. Choice of estimation method 
 
Capturing the evolution and the interdependencies between multiple macroeconomic 
time series entails vector autoregression models to be employed, as they appear to be most 
relevant for this purpose. Since nearly all variables from the ultimate data set, except for the 
trade confidence index (SI_TRADE), exhibit unit root, vector error correction model (VECM) 
seemed to be the best option. The system allows for maximum eight lags. Although both 
Wald lag exclusion test and lag length criteria validate the specification with eight lags, 
overloading such a concise model with so many parameters does not seem to be reasonable 
from theoretical point of view. Finally, the representation with six lags is tested. Lags two and 
five do not pass the test, but they are not excluded, since no theoretical explanation seems 
feasible in this case. Probably it is the shortness of time series which spoils the test results. 
 
Table 4. Lag exclusion test for the specification with six lags. Numbers are p-values 
 
Sample: 2005M01 2010M12 Included observations: 66 
 
TOT_C_ 
LOANS_ 
QQ 
RETAIL_ 
SALES_YY 
SI_ 
TRADE 
NPL_ 
CORPO_ 
QQ_PP 
SME_LT_ 
DEMAND 
POLONIA_ 
RATE_M 
POLONIA_ 
TURNOVER 
JOINT 
Lag 
1 
0.000123 0.786240 0.000622 2.26e-06 0.094980 0.018955 0.348944 0.000000 
Lag 
2 
0.254061 0.872605 0.882387 0.889927 0.672205 0.945880 0.555583 0.590760 
Lag 
3 
0.039737 0.419636 0.033821 0.291775 0.763842 0.539723 0.299724 1.20e-05 
Lag 
4 
0.942206 0.973629 0.360840 0.486999 0.286614 0.097939 0.084008 0.001312 
Lag 
5 
0.363105 0.675672 0.294864 0.742457 0.797899 0.557277 0.689711 0.287322 
Lag 
6 
0.104446 0.992601 0.004425 0.644128 0.896700 0.927370 0.326620 0.000162 
df 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
After defining appropriate lag length, however, Johansen cointegration test has been 
carried out and revealed that no cointegrating equations may be defined. 
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Table 5. Johansen cointegration test output: summarized all five sets of assumptions 
 
Sample: 2005M01 2010M12 Included observations: 70 
Series: TOT_C_LOANS_QQ RETAIL_SALES_YY SI_TRADE NPL_CORPO_QQ_PP 
SME_LT_DEMAND POLONIA_RATE_M POLONIA_TURNOVER 
Lag interval: 1 to 1 
Specification: 1 2 3 4 5 
Data trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Intercept: No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trend: No No No Yes Yes 
Trace 3 4 7 3 4 
Max-Eig 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Although trace statistic yields equivocal results, maximal eigenvalue method is 
commonly referred to as more reliable and it should be taken into consideration as primary 
indicator for the number of cointegrating relations. Such an approach is recommended e.g. by 
Kennedy (2003), and Johansen and Juselius (1990), who point out that maximal eigenvalue 
test is more powerful than trace test by providing more definite results. As far as it can be 
inferred from the visual inspection of the data, the second specification (intercept, but no 
trend) is the most relevant in this case. A detailed Johansen test, presented below, strengthens 
the obtained results. Max-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 6. Johansen cointegration test output given assumptions of no deterministic trend 
in data and intercept in cointegrating equations 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized 
number of CEs 
Eigenvalue 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0.05 Critical 
Value 
Prob. 
None  0.461186  43.28698  47.07897  0.1204 
At most 1  0.391130  34.73058  40.95680  0.2120 
At most 2  0.323882  27.39712  34.80587  0.2913 
At most 3  0.306811  25.65170  28.58808  0.1134 
At most 4  0.199801  15.60260  22.29962  0.3274 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Given no cointegration, the return to VAR-based modeling on non-stationary levels is 
justified according to e.g. Canova (2007), as long as the residuals remain stationary. As a 
matter of fact, there are also some researchers who prefer the differenced time series to be 
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estimated instead (see Kakes, 2000; Wang, Kutan and Yang, 2005), but this approach will not 
be followed now. The stationarity of residuals will be formally verified with the help of ADF 
test, but the figures below already indicate that error terms are rather not spoilt by any serial 
correlation and can be assumed to be white noise. 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 27. SVAR residual plots. 
 
Table 7. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity of the residuals 
 
Null Hypothesis: a given residual has a unit root Max lag = 6 
Time series Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic Prob. 
TOT_C_LOANS_QQ -9.360625  0.0000 
RETAIL_SALES_YY -7.671519  0.0000 
SI_TRADE -7.957878  0.0000 
NPL_CORPO_QQ_PP -10.37334  0.0000 
SME_LT_DEMAND -9.131117  0.0000 
POLONIA_RATE_M -8.783385  0.0000 
POLONIA_TURNOVER -8.995802  0.0000 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
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In order to diagnose the credit crunch, a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
model, based on monthly data, was selected. It allows for appropriate orthogonalization of 
external shocks and deriving correct inferences concerning causal relationships in the system. 
Not only the joint dynamics of a set of variables is represented, but also the economic 
relationships are reflected more accurately than by the reduced form of VAR. In this chapter, 
a model building process will be briefly replicated, so that to ensure it possesses an 
appropriate theoretical structure and yield relatively reliable estimates of potential output. 
Structural VAR model’s cornerstone principles were set in the 1980s after the renowned Sims 
critique. The major one is no a priori supposition of endogeneity or exogeneity. Overall, two 
features of the structural form make it the preferred candidate to represent the underlying 
relations in our model: 
- Error terms are not correlated. The structural, economic shocks which drive the dynamics 
of the economic variables are independent, which infers zero correlation between error 
terms as a desired property.  
- Variables can have a contemporaneous impact on other variables. This is a desirable 
feature particularly when using low frequency data. 
Using SVAR models we determine the shock and then discuss impulse responses of the 
dependent variable. Since the impulse responses can substantially differ in various 
identification schemes, a theoretical justification is provided to derive arguments in support of 
the robustness of results. 
 
4.2. Credit crunch model 
 
4.2.1. Specification 
 
Numerous experiments with different data sets, lag lengths, orderings of variables, as 
well as with different forms of VAR have been carried out. The available time series were 
very short in some areas, e.g. variables capturing the interbank market are quoted only since 
January 2005, while the Senior Loan Officer Survey was first released in the last quarter of 
2003. This is a serious malady when forming a long-term model. Therefore, the effort in this 
paper is directed toward the short-term, crunch-dedicated measurement. The quasi-dependent 
variable, from point of view of this paper’s main goal, is the quarter-on-quarter percent 
change in outstanding amount of corporate lending. Both large firms, and small and medium-
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sized enterprises are included, as contrary to self-employed sole traders and individual 
farmers that are not treated as firms in this framework. The set of variables, which remained 
robust after numerous iterations is presented in the table below, which precedes the extended 
description. Available time intervals for selected variables were displayed for information 
purposes only. In the model, 2005M01-2010M12 time span is employed, as the joint time 
interval of VAR is always as long as the overlap between the time series of all variables in the 
system. 
 
Table 8.  The data set of regressors 
 
 Variable Unit Time interval Source 
1. Quarter-on-quarter change in 
outstanding amount of corporate loans 
(TOT_C_LOANS_QQ) 
percentage 1997M03 – 
2010M12 
NBP 
2. Year-on-year growth in retail sales 
(RETAIL_SALES_YY) 
percentage 1998M04 – 
2010M12 
GUS 
3. Trade confidence index (SI_TRADE) pure number 2000M03 – 
2010M12 
GUS 
4. Quarter-on-quarter change in non-
performing corporate loans’ share in 
total outstanding corporate loans 
(NPL_CORPO_QQ_PP) 
percentage 
points 
1996M12 – 
2010M12 
NBP 
5. Demand of small and medium sized 
enterprises for long-term credit 
(SME_LT_DEMAND) 
(net) percentage 2003M10 – 
2010M12 
NBP: 
SLOS 
6. Average monthly unweighted 
POLONIA reference rate 
(POLONIA_RATE_M) 
pure number 
(representing a 
percentage) 
2005M01 – 
2010M12 
NBP 
7. Average monthly turnover of 
interbank POLONIA O/N transactions 
(POLONIA_TURNOVER) 
million PLN 2005M01 – 
2010M12 
NBP 
 
Source:  NBP, GUS. 
 
Most of the variables in this framework are self-explanatory. Quarter-on-quarter 
changes in the “dependent” variable were chosen as they match the characteristics of a short 
term approach better than the absolute values of outstanding credit, and yield more 
convincing estimates. Year-on-year growth in retail sales and trade sentiment indicator are 
standardized, unmodified economic indices published by GUS. The demand SMEs for credit 
is a SLOS-originated variable, with its measurement based on the net percentage method, 
explained earlier in this paper. The variable was directly extracted from the data. Quarterly 
changes in NPLs’ share in total corporate loans were found to yield better results than NPLs’ 
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absolute levels, therefore they were retained in the model in this form. POLONIA reference 
rate is calculated as an average weighted of the rates and amounts of transactions provided by 
the market players. At the moment, POLONIA rate describes, on average, 57 percent of the 
concluded interbank O/N transactions (see ACI Polska – The Polish Financial Markets 
Association, n.d.). So it is not a perfect proxy, but it still captures the actuality quite 
satisfactorily. 
SVARs coefficients are not economically interpretable. Therefore, providing the 
model’s exact and very extensive specification is not much of a help. Nevertheless, what 
matters here is the structural factorization formula, which reflects an intuitive comprehension 
of the economic interrelations and which allows for producing instructive impulse response 
functions. The variables are incorporated in the model in an identical order as presented in the 
table above, which means that this more or less mirrors the intuitive causality. The 
“dependent” variable is left in the first place. Later on, it was assumed that data on retail sales 
is the major stimulus, pretty much independent of the other ones. A shift in retail sales is 
thought to directly cause the relevant sentiment index to either boost or decline. If it declines, 
NPLs grow automatically. In response to this change, firms’ demand for credit may either 
soar, if they e.g. desperately need extra liquidity, or decrease, if they e.g. want to wait till the 
hardships are over. Judging from SMEs’ demand and weighing non-performing loans ratio, 
banks manage their liquidity to ensure sufficient money supply. For this purpose they trade 
with each other in the interbank market. There the interest rate is formed and, accordingly, the 
turnover is determined. This completes the reasoning behind the structural factorization 
procedure. 
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Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 28. Crucial interplays in the model, influencing structural factorization. Increased 
retail sales reinforces confidence in the market. Sentiments, if enhanced, keep the 
corporate credit quality high (low NPLs). The lower NPLs, the more companies 
seeking credit opportunities. With the increased demand, the cost of money in the 
interbank market surges. Accordingly, the turnover figure plunges. The weakest 
link of this inference lies in customers’ demand for credit, which – intuitively – 
may fluctuate twofold in response to a certain NPLs input. Here, the correlation 
coefficient turned out to be negative. Moreover, it is not unambiguous whether 
interbank interest rate should hike in response to higher demand. 
 
4.2.2. Performance 
 
The deterministic model below indicates, how successfully 2005-2007 variables were 
in yielding 2008-2010 dependent variable’s estimations, as compared with actual, already 
known, values. The constructed model was rather optimistic and produced over 207 billion 
PLN of corporate loans at the end of 2010, comparing with slightly more than 204 billion 
PLN factually. Modeled quarter-on-quarter fluctuations are smoother than the actual values. 
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Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 29. Deterministic model of 2008-
2010 corporate quarter-on-
quarter lending (percents), 
using 2005-2007 data as input, 
compared with actual values. 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 30. Deterministic model of 2008-
2010 outstanding corporate 
loans (m PLN), using 2005-
2007 data as input, compared 
with actual values. 
 
Another checkpoint of the model’s predictive power is made in the middle of 2009, as 
only 25 percent of the time span is estimated, with 75 percent of actuals. The output should 
thus be of enhanced quality. Although the model is still helpless in defining more exact 
marginal changes, it again fares well in the long run and yields plausible end-of-sample result. 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 31. Deterministic model of 
2H2009-2010 corporate 
quarter-on-quarter lending 
(percents), using 2005-1H2009 
data as input, compared with 
actual values. 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 32. Deterministic model of 
2H2009-2010 outstanding 
corporate loans (m PLN), using 
2005-1H2009 data as input, 
compared with actual values.
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 However, the nearest future will show how usable the model really is. Particularly, how 
resistant it is to shrinkage, i.e. an effect in which fitted relationship performs inferior on a new 
data set than on the data set used for fitting. As for now, the credit crunch model successfully 
forecasted a rebound at the beginning of 2011. At the moment of submission of this paper, the 
data for five months of 2011 were available. According to the two-year forecast, the upturn is 
going to be fair, with a quarter-on-quarter dynamics oscillating around 4 percent. 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 33. Deterministic model of 2011-2012 corporate quarter-on-quarter lending 
fluctuations (percents), using 2005-2010 data as input, compared with actual 
values for the first five months of 2011. 
 
However, it has to be made clear at this juncture that the credit crunch model is not 
claimed to be plausible in the long run, as it was not meant to be its task. The long term 
corporate lending model is subject to further exertion. 
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4.3. Structural analysis 
 
As it has already been said, VAR models, whichever the variation, are difficult to 
interpret due to many parameters and complex interactions and feedbacks between the 
variables. Due to the unbelievable bulk of interactions, stirring reversal causality dilemmas, 
the dynamic properties of a VAR are typically summarized using various types of structural 
analysis. The structural analysis summary tools that I am going to use are impulse response 
function and variance decomposition. I present also Granger causality tests. However, the 
latter are only useful a priori, i.e. when constructing the model, rather than a posteriori, i.e. 
when diagnosing its performance. 
 
4.3.1. Granger causality tests 
 
Many variables have been identified to potentially influence a percentage change of 
outstanding corporate loans on a quarter-on-quarter basis. It does not yet indicate a viable 
causal link, but a certain predictive power may be associated with a vast range of variables. 
This “affluence trap” determined a need for a thorough search of the model’s best 
specification and numerous iterations have been performed. The experiment below was 
conducted only for the variables having their “roots” dated earlier than 2002, in order to 
assure significant dissimilarities between the full time series and its truncated counterpart. The 
analysis may serve as preliminary diagnostics for the forthcoming construction of the long 
term corporate lending model. 
Again, the notion of Granger causality does not necessitate true causality. It only 
implies forecasting ability (Zivot and Wang, 2003: 405). 
 
Table 9.  Granger causality tests run for quarter-on-quarter percentage change in outstanding 
corporate loans, with six lags. Stars indicate significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 
(**) and 0.1 (*) levels. Variables performing by at least one significance threshold 
better in one of model options have been bolded. 
 
  
Long-term period 
(1996M12 2010M12) 
Credit crunch model 
(2005M01 2010M12) 
1. Year-on-year change in retail sales YES ** YES *** 
2. Unemployment YES ** NO - 
3. Confidence index in the economy YES *** YES *** 
4. Industry confidence index YES ** YES *** 
5. Consumer confidence index YES *** YES *** 
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Long-term period 
(1996M12 2010M12) 
Credit crunch model 
(2005M01 2010M12) 
6. Trade confidence index YES * YES * 
7. Construction sector confidence 
index 
YES *** YES *** 
8. Non-performing non-financial 
sector loans 
YES * YES ** 
9. Non-performing corporate loans NO - YES *** 
10. Banks’ deposit base YES ** YES ** 
11. Quarter-on-quarter change in 
foreign indebtedness of non-
banking and non-government 
sectors 
NO - YES ** 
12. Quarter-on-quarter change in the net 
foreign assets of the Polish banking 
sector 
NO - YES ** 
 
Source:  EViews 5 output. 
 
As the table indicates, some variables are only dedicated to the short-term analysis 
(foreign indebtedness of economic agents, net foreign assets of the banking sector, non-
performing loans), whereas unemployment is purely long-term lending determinant, with no 
short-term utility. Unfortunately, the shortage of truly long time series limited the comparison 
of Granger tests to only twelve variables. 
 
4.3.2. Impulse response functions 
 
Impulse response functions are keys to understand the outcome of every VAR-type 
model. They indicate how a given variable reacts to external shocks in the dynamic system. 
Figures below plot the impulse responses to various shocks together with two standard error 
intervals. The impact of some shocks takes time to feed through to the economy to reach the 
peak value. The relatively fastest reaction of corporate lending levels is in response to the 
trade confidence index. As it may be seen, a boost in retail sales is the biggest contributor to 
the increased lending. Taking decent consumer demand for granted, both banks are more 
tuned to lend, and enterprises are eager to borrow. It is quite analogical with an indicator of 
sentiment in trade. However, the magnitude of this shock is slighter. 
It should be emphasized that the analyzed short-term model is quite robustly based on 
indirect variables, like retail sales or trade sentiment indicator. Due to multiple links between 
various variables, even these cannot be considered purely non-fundamental, though. 
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Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 34. Impulse response functions depicting accumulated response of a quarter-on-
quarter change (percent) in total outstanding corporate loans, to structural one 
standard deviation shocks in the indicated variables. Abscissas indicate time (in 
months). 
 
In order to prove the stability of impulse response function, a 20-year perspective is 
provided: 
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Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 35. Impulse response functions depicting response of a quarter-on-quarter change 
(percent) in total outstanding corporate loans, to structural one standard deviation 
shocks in the indicated variables. Abscissas indicate time (in months). Impulse 
response functions are here non-accumulated and run for 20 years to present their 
stability. 
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4.3.3. Variance decomposition 
 
Source: EViews 5 output. 
 
Figure 36. Variance decomposition charts depicting the share of shocks related to the 
indicated variables in the “explained” variable’s variance. Abscissas indicate time 
(in months). 
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Variance decomposition analysis provides additional source of insight. It may be seen 
that particular shocks are not very dramatic, each of them accounting for no more than 20 
percent of the “explained” variable’s variance. The response of the “explained” variable that 
is due to itself is somewhat elevated, which signals autoregression. However, it does not 
appear to ruin the interpretation in the underlying framework. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The key findings of the underlying credit crunch econometric model and the 
accompanying qualitative analysis are only partly intuitive, with some rather unexpected 
outcomes. Those who have been voicing prophecies that foreign-based parent banks will drain 
the domestic banking industry from capital, were wrong. Instead, the theory that foreign 
ownership alleviates shocks proved to be right. Those who believed that the contraction of 
credit is caused in equal extent by supply-side and demand-side factors, also did not capture 
the reality accurately. Weakened demand had its impact, mainly in 2010 when some banks 
started to lend more courageously again, but it was not a decisive determinant. Despite 
premature calls audible in the early stages of the crisis that liquidity in the sector has to be 
reinforced, the liquidity standing of most banks remained very good. Apparently, the 
underlying problem was psychological, as banks were hoarding the cash instead of  
distributing it in form of credits, and were also unwilling to lend to each other in the interbank 
market, which hampered short-term liquidity position of some banks. Monetary policy was 
balanced and regulatory measures practically did not exert any influence on corporate lending. 
The central bank failed to animate the interbank market and reduce interest rate spreads that 
became highly distorted. Those banks that did not have either reliable foreign funding or 
strong deposit base, were the major victims of the interbank market imperfections. Overall, 
the research has shown that behavioral determinants, at first sight remote from the issue of 
corporate credit, wield profound explanatory power. Retail sales and trade sentiment index, 
being the “litmus paper” of the general economic climate, both account for approximately 35 
percent of corporate credit fluctuations. Boosted non-performing loans, indicating that 
something ill takes place in the economy, explain approximately 15 percent of the variance in 
the long run. However, quite interestingly, relative measures of NPLs have been found to be a 
much more accurate regressor than their absolute measures. which signals adaptive 
expectations. It seems that the economy that once got rid of unsustainably high NPLs, is more 
sensitive to their even minor increase later on. Last but not least, quarter-on-quarter corporate 
lending exhibits quite intense autocorrelation, explaining roughly more than 40 percent of its 
own variance up to 18 months, and less than 40 percent of its own variance afterwards. This 
effect may occur due to several reasons, which are subject to further analysis, e.g.: rolling 
over debt into subsequent periods, staged financing or the stylized fact of volatility clustering. 
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As regards the subject matter elaborated here, this study is undoubtedly a preliminary 
one, particularly in terms of econometric modeling. There are numerous directions to which 
the further analysis may fruitfully take off from here. First, boom and bust cycles, identified 
throughout the sample period, may be put under more precise investigation to determine the 
mutable behavior of given variables with regard to contemporary macroeconomic 
environment. Second, a greater effort may be applied to granulate the data, e.g. to split the 
affected indebtedness volume into short-term and long-term, or to control for industries, 
which have suffered most, which would signpost their disadvantaged strategic positioning. 
More informative output would be obtained on what factors or behaviors entail which 
feedback. Third, a similar attempt may be made to capture the household credit supply and 
demand determinants. However, this case would probably require refining the here presented 
approach quite substantially. Exercising on this topic might get deeper, but it requires long 
time-series, as well as more comprehensive ones. Unfortunately such long series are not 
currently available for Poland, since it embarked on its transition only in the early 1990s and 
it took time to achieve decent stock of statistical data. With particular respect to the current 
crisis, time is also needed to unravel additional facts regarding the crunch. Naturally, the 
enriched econometric analysis, putting alternative specifications and methods in place, would 
furthermore contribute to the greater understanding of how influences were distributed. 
This analysis is ex-post and it would not be impossible if the interrelations presented 
here were one-off. However, the forecasting potential of the presented model is subject to 
prompt verification. Naturally, other specifications capturing the pertinent issue are feasible, 
provided that alternative, compelling theoretical framework is developed. The inescapable 
constraint of the here developed model is also its non-universality, in a sense that it is relevant 
exclusively to the Polish market. While analyzing the phenomenon of the crisis, one should 
also be aware of the fact that it is still “living” and no ultimate conclusions should be derived, 
as scholars generally agree that the slowdown may still get worse. Meanwhile, however, the 
first quarter of 2011 was already a fourth in a row, in which banks reduced margins for 
corporate loans (Tomaszkiewicz, 2011). This bodes well for future. Demand rebuilds 
accordingly and the outstanding corporate credit arose month-on-month by 0.9 percent and 
exceeded 209 billion PLN in March 2011, that is the highest level since November 2009. 
Year-on-year growth rates in March, April and May were all within the range between 4 and 
6.4 percent, and with deposits rising even faster – but slower than in 2010 – robust 
fundamentals underlying the forthcoming revival are placed, which is mirrored by elevated 
Moody’s rating for the Polish banking sector, from negative to stable, dated mid-June. 
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